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ABSTRACT 
 
PERCEPTUAL DEHUMANIZATION 
Katrina M. Fincher 
Philip E. Tetlock 
The results of eighteen studies support the hypothesis that the holistic processing of 
faces is attenuated by social facts in a manner that serves the formation of cooperative, non-kin 
based communities. The first chapter establishes the phenomenon of Perceptual Dehumanization 
through demonstrating a functional link between face processing and social behavior. A multi-
method array of social and perceptual techniques suggests that the holistic processing of faces is 
inhibited upon learning someone is a norm violator and that this inhibition of holistic processing 
facilitates punishment.  The second chapter determines the social function of Perceptual 
Dehumanization.  It combines past theoretical accounts of dehumanization with modern work on 
perceptual categorization to propose that perceptual dehumanization functions to produce 
indifference towards harm (as opposed to facilitating the active or passive infliction of harm).  This 
thesis is supported by results from multiple methods, which indicate that the holistic processing of 
faces is inhibited for high status civil servant.  Consistently, these inhibitions in holistic processing 
facilitate the sacrifice of these civil servants for the greater good.  The third chapter establishes 
the cognitive mechanism through which the attenuation of holistic processing occurs.  Results 
from both eye-tracking and exogenous manipulations of attention suggest that Perceptual 
Dehumanization occurs due to a shift in the gaze pattern that causes both changes in perceptual 
processing and social behavior.  This program of research emphasizes the interdependency 
between human’s ability to identify faces (i.e. engage in holistic processing) and human’s ability 
to forge longstanding non-kin cooperative bonds; it suggests face perception is an inherently 
social process.  More broadly it suggests combing social functionalism and cognitive structuralism 
may be a fruitful avenue for future research.  
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PREFACE  
Exploring the Consequences, Function and Mechanism of Perceptual Dehumanization  
As in other species, the social world of our ancestors contained individuals who were 
poised to exploit others if such acts were self-beneficial (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Duntley, 2005; 
Duntley & Buss, 2004).  This tendency for exploitation brings with it the tendency for exploitation 
to engender a retaliatory response.  This suggests that human behavior requires the capacity for 
unfeeling and brutish behavior.  However, unlike most other species, human societies rely upon 
large-scale cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals (Boyd & Richardson, 1996; 
Hrushka, 2010).  This suggests that human behavior also requires the capacity for kind and 
benevolent behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).  
A diverse body of work has provided a multidimensional understanding of the 
evolutionary dilemma posed by cooperation.  Work from computational modeling suggests that 
forgiving, but intermittently punitive strategies are optimal for facilitating cooperation and avoiding 
the echo-effect in noisy environments (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006).  Social network 
analysis suggests that homophily provides a mechanism for individuals to avoid exploitation 
(Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler & Christakis, 2012).  Economists have 
highlighted the importance of third party punishment and evolutionary psychologist suggested 
cognitive modules such as cheater detection enable such interdependence among humans (Fehr 
& Gachter, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). 
While each of these approaches provides unique explanatory power, they do not resolve 
the intrapsychic conflict these two forms of motivation suggest.  The contradictory motivational 
forces cooperative equilibrium requires, imply a psyche that can switch readily between kind and 
cooperative behavior and aggressive potentially callous behavior.  How is a species with kind and 
cooperative tendencies able to act in an aggressive and callous manner without arousing 
dissonance or remorse?  This dissertation leverages perceptual and social psychology to argue 
that changes in perceptual processes facilitate a cooperative social order. 
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As a social and interdependent species, faces are among the most important visual 
stimuli humans perceive.  Faces inform a person's identity, mood, sex, age and direction of gaze 
(which connotes intentions and desires) (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000).  Perhaps most 
importantly, facial recognition enables humans to identify an enormous number of individuals 
within a fraction of a second of viewing their face (Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; 
Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000, 2002). The ability to identify faces allows humans to ascribe 
discrete identities to actors.  Importantly, this ability enables individuals to discern cooperators 
and defectors in repeated social interactions.  Moreover, assigning discrete identities to actors 
enables individuals to assign social reputations to actors; reputational consequences produce 
substantial incentives to cooperate as they dramatically increase the consequences of defection 
(Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Nowak, 2006; Fu, Hauert, Nowak & Wang, 2008).  The 
links between face recognition and identity, and identity and cooperation suggest a deep 
connection between face perception and cooperation.   
Given the importance of faces in human’s social environment, it is perhaps not surprising 
that humans are very skilled at face recognition.  There is a large body of evidence which 
suggests that face and object recognition involve qualitatively different processes—with faces 
eliciting more configural or holistic processing and objects more analytical or attribute-based 
processing (Farah, Levinson, Klien, 1995; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011; Kanwisher, Tong, 
& Nakayama, 1998; Tarr, & Gauthier, 2000; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; Avidan, 
Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011).  Furthermore, face perception, or holistic processing more generally, 
requires a large amount of dedicated neural tissue-- which notably represents more cortical tissue 
than the many other encapsulated modules such as the language system (Kanwisher, 2000).  
The social importance of faces is frequently used in support of face-specific processing – 
or the notion that humans have evolved to have a cognitive module which is dedicated to face 
specific processing (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006).  However, if 
face perception evolved to serve social goals, there is little reason to believe face specific 
processing occurs independently from selection pressures in the social world. Consistently, 
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recent work suggests social processes may impact face perception (e.g. MacLin & Malpass, 
2001, 2003). 
This emerging body of work suggests that there are a numerous instances where social 
information leads to attenuations in the holistic (face typical) processing of faces (Kelly, Quinn, 
Slater, Lee, Ge & Pascalis, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Van Bavel, 
Packer, Cunningham, 2011).  In this research thus far there has been a tight link between the 
groups that are dehumanized perceptually (an attenuation of the perceptual processes 
associated with humans) and those that are dehumanized socially (attenuation of compassion 
associated with the treatment of other humans).  This work has focused on the perceptual 
mechanisms underlying these changes in processing – indeed, strong convergent evidence 
suggest an attenuation of holistic processing.  
There is a long history, beginning with the “new look,” (Bruner, 1957), which suggests 
social processes can alter perceptual ones. In the domain of face processing, change may have 
deep functional significance since the holistic processing of a face is the perceptual 
categorization of an individual as human.  Therefore changes in processing represent a denial of 
the perceptual markers of humanity—a perceptual dehumanization.   
As with work on dehumanization, which has adapted a deeply functionalist perspective 
(e.g. Bandura, 1999; Haslam, 2006; Kelman, 1973; Optow, 1990), we suggest that this change in 
perception facilitates social goals.  In the current work, we explore attenuation in (putatively) face-
specific processing from a social functionalist perspective—we ask how the attenuation of face 
processing facilitates human social life.  More concretely, how it allows individuals to thrive in 
collectivities regulated by complex accountability relationships, norms, and values. 
In this dissertation we explore if (Chapter 1), why (Chapter 2), and how (Chapter 3) 
attenuations in the holistic processing of faces serve the social factors that enable humans to 
form cooperative communities. We focus this exploration around the following key questions: (1) 
Does a functionalist relationship between face-processing and social goals exist?  Does the 
attenuation in holistic processing both spontaneously occur and facilitate socially adaptive 
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behavior? (2) Why do these changes in processing occur?  What is the broader social function of 
attenuations in face-processing?  (3) How do these changes in processing occur?  What is the 
cognitive-perceptual mechanism underlying attenuations in face-processing?   
Chapter 1 Overview 
The first chapter aims to establish a functionalist relationship between face-processing and 
social goals and behavior.  Face processes need to interact with social behavior in two regards to 
establish a functionalist relationship exist: (1) social information needs to bring about changes in 
face processing; (2) changes in face processing need to facilitate socially relevant behavior.   
We establish a bidirectional relationship between facial processing and social information 
using norm violators.  We build a theory of perceptual dehumanization, which proposes that 
individuals do not perceive the targets of retributivist wrath as fully human.  We demonstrate that 
knowledge that an individual is a norm violator leads to attenuation in face-typical processing 
which, in turn, influences punitive behavior. 
Norm violators provide an interesting avenue for exploring face-processing effects because 
punishment is a common although curious behavioral response.  While people are predisposed to 
punish norm violators and perhaps even derive positive utility from this behavior (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004), punishment results in the suffering of defenseless fellow human beings.  
Given the high frequency of prosocial behavior observed among humans (Lowenstien & Small, 
2007), it is striking that humans so frequently engage in behavior that, were it not collectively 
sanctioned, would be regarded as profoundly anti-social.  Punishment therefore strikingly 
highlights the question: What mental mechanisms make it possible for people to become 
indifferent to, or even enjoy, the suffering of a fellow human being?  
Although there are many domains in which individuals are surprisingly indifferent to the 
suffering of others, punishment provides a particularly useful avenue for exploring the theory of 
perceptual dehumanization.  First, unlike racial discrimination or ethnic genocide, when exploring 
the punitive response, facial stimuli can be randomly paired to social categories.  As a result, one 
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can definitively conclude that perceptual effects are driven by the social information and not by 
properties of the stimulus. Secondly, a large body of research has developed clear tools for 
measuring punitive attitudes (e.g. Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2001; McKee, I. R., & Feather, 
2008).   
Finally, it is possible to measure punitive response directly.  Unlike work on racial attitudes, 
which suggest a high degree of casuistry (Norton, Vandello & Darley, 2004), harming norm 
violators is relatively socially acceptable (Cohen, 2012; Tyler, 1996).  Given that it is unclear if 
perceptual dehumanization functions implicitly or explicitly, it is important to examine if these 
effects occur in a domain with relatively high correspondence between implicit and explicit 
attitudes.    
Chapter 1 uses seven studies to test the functionalist relationship between punishment 
and facial processing.  Studies 1 through 5 use a multi-method array of techniques to address the 
question: do people process the faces of norm violators differently from those of others?  These 
studies serve to establish convergent validity that the impairment in facial processing is due to an 
attenuation of holistic processing and that impairment in processing is specifically elicited by norm 
violators and not secondary features of the action.   
Studies 6 and 7 test the functionalist claim that an attenuation of holistic processing 
facilitates punitive behavior.  Using multiple methods of impairment, Study 6 examines if featural 
processing makes it easier to punish norm violators.  Finally, Study 7 establishes a link between a 
common punitive practices and the impairment of holistic processing.   
Chapter 2 Overview 
The second chapter aims to establish the social function of attenuations in the holistic 
processing of faces.  It links the emerging body of work suggesting a perceptual denial of 
humanness to classic functionalist arguments on dehumanization.  
Classic accounts of dehumanization suggest that it functions to facilitate violence.  This 
research argues that dehumanization allows moral self-sanctions to be disengaged by no longer 
viewing the target of dehumanization as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns but as a sub-
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human objects (Kelman, 1976; Optow, 1990; Bandura, 1999, 2002).  Dehumanization therefore 
occurs in situations where the target is stigmatized or otherwise viewed as inferior.   
However, the attenuation of face-typical processing appears to occur in a broad range of 
circumstances, which do not necessarily involve the disengagement of classic moral rules.  For 
example, the attenuation of face specific processing occurs in benign circumstances, such as 
minimal groups (Bernstein, Young & Hugenberg, 2007). Because perceptual dehumanization also 
occurs in situations where there is little motivation to harm, this suggest perceptual 
dehumanization may act to inhibit helping behavior rather than facilitate harm.  
Distinguishing between these two possibilities is difficult because from most evolutionary, 
economic or social evaluative perspectives, the individuals whom people do not help are those of 
low value and low competence.   However, there are instances when these two possibilities can 
be disambiguated.  If our theoretical claim is correct, there are various group level situations, 
such as war, in which helping is socially detrimental. To protect in-group members and their 
interests, people must sometimes override concern and deny honored civil servants the concern 
due to ordinary people.  
Chapter 2 uses six studies to test this claim.  Studies 1 through 4 use a multi-method 
array of techniques to test the breath of dehumanization.  These studies suggest that individuals 
spontaneously attenuate perceptual processing of both norm violators and honored civil servants 
in high-risk roles. Furthermore, if the theory of Perceptual Dehumanization applies in these cases, 
participants should not only show an attenuation of face typical processing but the change in 
processing should facilitate utilitarian behavior. In the case of high-status but potentially sacrificial 
actors, perceptual dehumanization should make sacrifices easier. Using multiple methods of 
impairment, studies 5 and 6 examines if featural processing makes it easier to act in line with the 
greater social interest.   
Chapter 3 Overview 
The third chapter examines what is the cognitive-perceptual mechanism underlying 
attenuation in face processing. The attenuation of face specific processing is surprising because 
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it is inconsistent with well-established modularity based accounts of face-perception, which 
suggest that higher-order factors, such as social information, should not influence perception. 
Therefore work on perceptual dehumanization raises the question: how are these face-specific 
effects attenuated?   
It has been well established that social factors (e.g. emotion) can influence attentional 
scope, attentional capture and the target of attention (Rowe, Hisch & Anderson, 2007; Öhman, 
A., Flykt, A., & Esteves, 2001) and that attention can modulate the transmission of information 
during the early stages of sensoriperceptual analysis (e.g. Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998).  
Therefore, it is possible that perceptual changes are instantiated through altering the manner in 
which individuals attend to faces.  
Chapter 3 relies upon five studies to examine if changes in visual attention drive 
perceptual dehumanization.  Study 1 uses eye tracking to examine changes in visual attention.   
Studies 2-4 tests if exogenously manipulating attentional focus can diminish the effect of social 
information on face processing. Finally, study 5 examines if visual attention towards faces, effects 
behavior.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces Is Activated by Norm Violations and Facilitates 
Norm Enforcement 
 
On 1 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned "to make the amende honorable […] the 
flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, 
holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those 
places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and 
sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and 
body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds.  (Foucault, 1975, 
P.1).   
 Modern readers of Discipline and Punishment recoil from its lurid descriptions.  It is 
disturbing to imagine fellow human beings acting so savagely.  Yet the account was taken from a 
popular paper Gazette d'Amsterdam and, far from recoiling, a vast crowd gathered to catch a 
glimpse of the spectacle.  As modern readers, our reactions to the newspaper’s words are likely 
deeply different from those of readers in 1757.  All of which raises a fundamental question: What 
mental mechanisms make it possible for people to become indifferent to, or even enjoy, the 
suffering of a fellow human being?  
 This article cannot fully solve this social-functionalist puzzle but it does begin the process 
of assembling promising pieces.  Our inquiry centers on face perception: Do people process the 
faces of norm violators differently from those of others?  And, if so, what is the functional 
significance of this differential processing?  Does it make it easier to punish norm violators? 
 A useful starting point is to acknowledge the substantial experimental literature that has 
documented that people are predisposed to punish norm violators (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).  
Unlike most other species, human observers will incur personal costs to impose costs on those 
who harm others.  This punitive predisposition is hard to reduce to cold, cognitive utilitarian-
deterrence calculations (Darley & Pittman, 2003; McKee & Feather, 2008; Weiner, Graham, & 
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Reyna, 1997).  When the perpetrator is seen as culpable (Alicke, 2000) or blameworthy (Malle, 
Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Weiner et al., 1997), people tend to act like retributivists who punish 
in proportion to the harm done to the victims, (Tetlock et al., 2007) as well as the harm (real or 
symbolic) done to society as a whole (Atran & Ginges, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009).  
 However, it is also important to acknowledge that punishment causes harm on fellow 
human beings, who cannot defend themselves, to suffer.  Given the high frequency of helping 
and other prosocial behavior observed among humans (Lowenstien & Small, 2007), it is striking 
that humans so frequently engage in behavior that, were it not collectively sanctioned, would be 
regarded as profoundly anti-social.  For example, if it were not legitimized by the state, jailing 
would be considered kidnapping and execution, murder.  This disconnect is easiest to observe in 
the disgust people often feel for other cultures’ punitive practices (e.g. American attitudes toward 
Saudi Arabian justice or European attitudes towards capital punishment in the U.S.).  Although, 
prior work suggests that there are automatic mechanisms to facilitate the detection of norm 
violators (Cosmides, Barrett & Tooby, 2010; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), prior work has examined 
not examined the mechanisms that facilitate punishment itself.   
 Our working hypothesis is that visual mechanisms—in particular, the attenuation of face-
typical processing—enables punitive action.  Past research has found that showing the face of 
the target person increases willingness to help the person shown (e.g., Small & Loewenstein, 
2003; Kogut & Ritov, 2005, 2007).  We suggest that faces do not interfere with the punitive action 
aimed at norm violators because of rapid changes in the processing of the faces of those 
violators.  
 It has been well established that people are extremely skilled at recognizing faces.  A 
preference for faces like stimuli appears to be innate.  Babies react to facial distress (Johnson, 
Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991) and newborns preferentially orient toward stimuli with face-like 
first-order relations (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Mondloch, Lewis, Budreau, 
Maurer, Dannemiller, Stephens, & Kleiner-Gathercoal, 1999).  Adults can recognize an inordinate 
number of individuals quickly.  Even when these individuals have different hairstyle, are 
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presented from different viewpoints, in different lighting, or are even at different ages, that is, 
unless the presentation of the person is upside down or face-typical processing is otherwise 
disrupted (Johnson, 2005; Ellis, Bruce, & De Schonen, 1992). 
 Adults’ skill in recognizing faces is often attributed to holistic processing—processing not 
just the shapes of individual features but also the relations among them (Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011).  Neuro-cognitive researchers have amassed convincing evidence that holistic 
processing is distinct from other forms of perceptual processing; that certain regions of the brain 
are dedicated to holistic processing (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998; Tarr, & Gauthier, 
2000); and that individuals with localized damage to the fusiform area show selective impairment 
in holistic processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011).  
 There is some evidence that changes in facial processing connect to changes in social 
cognition.  Research suggests, for instance, that people process the faces of out-group members 
differently.  Although other race effects were long attributed to a differential motivation to encode 
the details of in-group (relative to out-group) members (e.g., Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008; Rodin, 
1987), a number of studies have shown that same-race faces are also processed more 
holistically (e.g. Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006).   
 One possible explanation for the differential processing is differential expertise. People 
tend to be more familiar with the types of faces that elicit holistic processing due to exposure (e.g. 
Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Ge & Pascalis, 2007).  However, another possible explanation is the top 
down modulation of perceptual processing due to social-motivational contextual factors.  For 
example, MacLin and Malpass (2001, 2003) manipulated the perceived race of racially 
ambiguous Hispanic-Black faces using hairstyle. Hispanic participants better remembered the 
same target when they believed it was Hispanic (i.e., it had a Hispanic-typical hairstyle), than 
when they believed it was Black (i.e., it had a black-typical hairstyle) even though the face 
remained the same.  Other research suggests that group affiliation even may be by itself 
sufficient to elicit changes in processing: group affiliation can attenuate the holistic processing of 
	  4	  
	  
faces (Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg, 2007) and similarly low socioeconomic status is 
associated with the attenuation of facial-typical processing in Caucasian (Shriver, Young, 
Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Lanter, 2008).  
Overview 
 
 This article explores the intersection between perceptual and social psychology.  Building 
upon prior work, we hypothesize a bidirectional relationship between social and perceptual 
processes.  We therefore examine both the impact of experimental manipulations of social 
contextual cues on facial information processing and the impact of experimental manipulations of 
facial information processing on a class of social judgments, punitiveness judgments.  Norm 
violators provide an important avenue for understanding interactions between social processes 
and perception because: (1) facial stimuli can be randomly paired to social categories; (2) 
harming norm violators is socially acceptable and can be measured directly.   
 We focus on the hypothesized social-functional consequences of changes in face 
processing.  We demonstrate that knowledge that an individual is a norm violator leads to an 
attenuation in face-typical processing which in turn, influence punitive behavior.  We propose that 
punishing transgressors is facilitated by these automatic perceptual changes, which occur outside 
of awareness.  
 The current series of 7 studies test hypotheses derived from a theory of perceptual 
dehumanization, which posits that individuals do not perceive the targets of retributivist wrath as 
fully human – the targets are “perceptually dehumanized.”  This perceptual shift facilities the 
infliction of harm.  Studies 1 through 5 use a multi-method array of techniques to address the 
question: do people process the faces of norm violators differently from those of others?  Studies 
6 and 7 use different methods to test whether featural processing makes it easier to punish norm 
violators.   
Study 1 
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 Studies 1 and 2 assess the degree to which information about prior behavior changes 
how faces are processed.  We predict the faces of norm violators are perceived differently from 
those of others.  Study 1 uses the facial inversion effect to gauge the inhibition in the face-specific 
processing of norm violators.   
 Specialized face processing is particularly vulnerable to orientation effects (Farah, 
Tanaka, & Drain, 1995).  Studies have consistently documented a face-inversion effect: a 180 
degree rotation of faces impairs recognition much more than a 180 degree rotation of comparably 
complex non-face objects (Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Yarmey, 1971).  An inhibition of the face-
inversion effect suggests a change in the way in which people are processing faces.  The theory 
of perceptual dehumanization predicts a reduction in the face-inversion effect for faces linked to 
negative but not positive actions.    
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 48 (28 Male and 20 Female) students at a northeastern 
university who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  Data was collected over 
a two-week period.  Sample size was determined by the number of students who volunteered to 
participate in the 12 days between the study posting and the end of the term.  The average age of 
participation was 20.4 (SD=.9) and s’s were liberal (M=5.2 on a 7 point scale).   
 Stimuli.  72 face stimuli were taken from Ballew and Todorov (2007).  Our images were 
restricted to white male runner-ups in gubernatorial elections.  Images were cropped to 150 × 215 
pixels, placed on a standard background, and converted to grayscale. 
 Procedure. We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.  
For every participant, the experiment consisted of six blocks, each consisting of 12 face–action 
associations.  In three blocks, faces appeared upright during both the study and test phases; in 
three blocks, the faces appeared as inverted during both the study and test phases.  To control 
for difficulty or learning effects, the order of blocks was randomized across participants.  Faces 
and actions were randomly assigned to one of six blocks.  For each participant faces appeared in 
a random order.  When any specific face appeared, the action associated with that face was 
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randomized independently.  This structure of randomization allowed us to control for three 
potential biases: (1) order effects; (2) bias due to a specific face; (3) bias due to a face-action 
pairing.    
 As Figure 1.1 shows, each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase. In the 
study phase, participants learned 12 face-action pairings by simultaneously seeing a single face 
(either upright or inverted) and a single action on a screen for 8.5 seconds.  Participants were told 
the individual depicted in the photograph had performed the action described below the 
photograph.  During the test phase, actions were shown in a random order below an array 
consisting of all 12 faces.  Participants were asked to identify the correct face from the array by 
indicating the number associated with face.  Face arrays were created by randomly assigning 
each of the 12 faces a number.   
 Actions appeared serially below the face array, and the participant identified the face 
originally linked to the action in learning phase from the array. Actions systematically varied in 
moral valence. Negative actions, norm violations, were restricted to actions resulting in five or 
more years in prison as indexed by mandatory minimum sentencing laws.  Language was taken 
from federal sentencing guidelines.  Whenever possible, to control for negativity dominance, we 
defined positive actions as intentional actions that resulted in 2 to 3 times the positive impact as 
the negative actions caused harm.  For example, a negative action of stealing $10,000 dollars 
would be paired with a positive action of donating $30,000 or murdering one individual was paired 
with saving the lives of two individuals.  Neutral actions reflected preferences that had no impact 
beyond the individual action. 
 After completing the memory task, participants were asked their gender, age and political 
beliefs.  All measures and conditions are reported here.   
Results 
All participants were included in the data analysis.  We conducted a 2 (orientation: 
upright, inverted) X 3(valence: positive, neutral, negative) repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each of the 6 act-face combinations.  Results 
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replicated the face inversion effect --participants were more accurate at identifying faces-action 
pairings when pairing used upright (M=.61, SD=.22) than inverted (M=.48, SD=.27) faces 
F(1,43)=33.4, p<.001, η!!  = .41.  
The hypothesized interaction between the orientation of the face and the valence of the 
action also emerged, F(2,43)=4.09, p<.05, η!!  = .15.  Participants were more accurate at 
identifying inverted faces paired with negative actions (M=.54, SD=.23)  than inverted faces 
paired with positive(M=.45, SD=.20), t(46) = 4.4, p < .001, d’= .41 or neutral actions (M=.45, 
SD=.21), t(46) = 2.9, p <.002, d’ = .40, but they were not more accurate at identifying upright 
faces paired with negative actions, t(46) = .2, p =.42.  There was clear reduction in the inversion 
effect for faces linked to negative actions.   
Discussion of Study 1 
The reduction in the facial inversion effect suggested that participants were no longer 
processing the faces of norm violators as they process other human faces.  Although this 
suggests a change in holistic processing, it is important to acknowledge that the facial inversion 
effect is not necessarily driven by changes in the holistic processing of faces.  The specific 
mechanisms underlying the facial inversion effect remain a topic of empirical debate (Young, 
Hellawell, & Hay, 1987).  In fact, recent work has argued that face inversion may simply reflect 
quantitative changes in processing rather than qualitative changes (Sekuler, Gaspar, Gold, & 
Bennett, 2004).  Although it is unclear what specific mechanisms are work in Study 1; Study 1 
suggests the faces of norm violators are clearly perceived “differently” from those of others. From 
a social psychological perspective, it is the atypicality that matters most, not the exact character 
of the perceptual mechanism.  
Study 2 
 
 Whereas Study 1 used an independent variable that impairs face typical processing, 
Study 2 uses an independent variable that impairs featural processing and enhances reliance on 
holistic processing.  Because the latter effect increases reliance on holistic information (the 
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process that, we argue, is being impaired by association with norm violators), this manipulation 
should reduce individuals’ ability to identify faces paired with norm violations.  Study 2 thus allows 
us to test the counter-hypothesis that the improved accuracy scores in Study 1 were simply 
driven by increased effort or by subtle measurement-scale artifacts.   
 Featural information about specific aspects of faces (e.g., shape of chin or nose) is finer 
grained than holistic information.  Therefore, removing high frequency spatial information should 
disproportionally degrade featural processing (Goffaux, Hault, Michel, Vuong, & Rossion, 2005) 
relative to holistic processing, thus increasing the relative role of the latter.  The perceptual 
dehumanization hypothesis predicts that the effects of facial blurring should be the opposite of 
facial inversion.  Low spatial frequency, blurring the faces, should reduce the identifiability of the 
inverted faces of norm violators relative to the faces of norm followers.  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 208 (88 Male and 120 Female) students at a 
northeastern university who participated in exchange for payment.  Data was collected over a 
one-week period in the Wharton Behavioral lab.  Sample size was determined by the number of 
participants who signed up to participate during the five day interval the study was scheduled to 
run.  The average age of participation was 20.5 (SD = .9) and liberal (M= 5.0 on a 7 point scale).   
Stimuli.  40 neutral expression male faces were taken from the KDEF database 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998).  The faces were Fourier transformed and multiplied by high-
pass Gaussian filters that preserved low (< 8 cycles/face width) spatial frequencies (see Figure 
1.2).  Full spectrum (FS) faces were also used. 
 Procedure.  We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.  
In four of the blocks, faces displayed were full spatial frequency, and in the other four blocks 
faces were low spatial frequency.  In each block participants completed a learning phase, 
followed by visual distraction and then a testing phase.  In the learning phase, participants 
learned 10 face-action pairings by simultaneously viewing a single face on screen (either normal 
resolution or low spatial frequency) and a single action for 12 seconds.  Participants were told the 
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individual depicted in the photograph had performed the action described below the photograph.  
Face and action randomization used the same method as Study 1.  During the test phase, all 10 
faces from the learning phase of the block were displayed in a single array that remained on 
screen.  Actions appeared serially below the face array, and the participant identified the face 
originally linked to the action in the learning phase from the array.  Face arrays were created by 
randomly assigning each of the 10 faces a number.  Actions systematically varied in moral 
valence as in Study1.  After completing the memory task, participants were asked their gender, 
age and political beliefs.  All measures and conditions are reported here.  
Results 
We conducted a 2 (spatial frequency: low only, high and low) X 2(valence: positive, 
neutral, negative) within-in subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response 
accuracy for each of the 4 act-face combinations.  Not surprisingly, given the reduction in 
identifying information, participants were more accurate at identifying face-action pairings when 
faces displayed full spatial frequency (M=.74, SD=.25) than low spatial frequency faces(M=.66, 
SD=.27), F(1,205)=58.2, p<.001, η!!  = .48.  The hypothesized interaction between spatial 
frequency and valence also emerged, F(2, 204)=38.8, p<.001η!!= .19.  Participants were less 
accurate at identifying low spatial frequency faces paired with negative actions (M= .60, SD=.28) 
than low spatial frequency faces paired with positive actions (M= .69, SD=.25), t(207) = 2.79, p 
=.002, d’=.34 or neutral actions (M= .68, SD=.27) t(207) = 2.05, p =.007, d’= .29.   
Discussion 
        Removing high frequency spatial information should disproportionately degrade featural 
processing (Goffaux et al., 2005) relative to other types of face processing, such as holistic, thus 
increasing the relative role of the latter.  As predicted, participants were relatively impaired when 
low frequency faces were linked to negative as opposed to positive actions.  This pattern of result 
suggests that participants rely more heavily on featural information when faces are linked to 
negative actions. Consistent with the theory of perceptual dehumanization, participants again did 
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not process the facial information of norm violators the same way that they processed other 
human faces.  
Study 3 
 
 There remain three interpretive problems with Studies 1 and 2.  First, because the 
actions and faces were displayed contemporaneously, participants may have spent different 
amounts of time looking at the face versus the actions across conditions.  Second, Studies 1 and 
2 manipulate the valence of an action, which allows many other features of the actions to vary.  
Finally, Studies 1 and 2 use a recall recognition task, rather than a perceptual matching task.  
Study 3 addresses all these issues.   
 First, this study addresses confounds due to timing by having the faces and actions 
displayed serially, rather than simultaneously.  Second, in studies 1 and 2 participants are 
exposed to targets that behaved in a moral, immoral or neutral fashion.  It is hypothesized that 
immoral (i.e., norm violators) targets trigger perceptual dehumanization.  To establish if this is the 
case, however, the valence of actions needs to be controlled to rule out the possibility of a 
general negativity effect on face processing.  Study 3 rules out this potential confound. To keep 
the negativity associated with the action the same across conditions, we use the same actions 
and vary whether the face is associated with the victim or the perpetrator of the harm.  This 
ensures any change in the processing of faces is due to the norm violation and not the valence of 
the action.   
 Finally, thus far it can be argued that effects are based in recall, not recognition.  Study 3 
uses a more traditional task by manipulating processing using the Face Composite Task (FCT) in 
which two faces are split horizontally and combined.  It’s easier to identify the top half-face when 
it’s misaligned with the bottom one than when the two halves are fitted smoothly together (Young 
et al., 1987).  This is because the impression of the composite image is a novel face that does not 
resemble the original person depicted in the top or bottom portion of the image.  As a result, 
participants are unable to selectively attend to the cued portion of the face.  However, when the 
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top and bottom half are misaligned, participants can recognize both the top and bottom half of the 
face.  This is because misaligning the faces disrupts holistic processing by allowing individuals to 
process the top and bottom half of the face separately.  To further diversify our methods of 
manipulating facial processing, Study 3 uses a facial composite task 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 53 (24 Male and 29 Female) students at a northeastern 
university who participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  Data was 
collected over a one-week period at the end of the semester.  Sample size was determined by 
signup.  
 Stimuli.  The Caucasian thirty-two male face stimuli taken from the Chicago Face 
Database (Ma, Correll, Witenbrink, 2015) were used to form face composites.  All faces were 
fitted onto a 256 x 256 pixel white background and converted to greyscale.  Pairing each target 
top part with a bottom part from another individual created composite faces.  In order to ensure 
same and different trials were identical, randomly paired top and bottom parts from different 
individuals to form both the study and test stimuli.  Luminance of the bottom half of each face, 
was adjusted to match the top half.  Each of the thirty-two target top parts appeared 
approximately once in each condition. 
 Procedure.  We used a modified Facial Composite Task to measure perceptual 
dehumanization.  As Figure 1.3 shows, prior to completing every other trial of the matching task, 
participants learned some background information about the individuals whom the two targets 
they are about to see correspond to.  Specifically, participants learned about a crime which 
occurred in which one of the individuals is the victim one of the individuals is the perpetrator.  An 
example action is: “Dylan shot Jeff during a robbery.”  The action appeared on screen for 8500 
milliseconds.  After reading the crime, participants performed a perceptual recognition task 
involving each of the actors as identified by using the name (e.g. “Dylan” or “Jeff”).  The matching 
task was separate for each of the targets.  The order of the perpetrator and victim was 
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counterbalanced.  Participants learned about 64 actions and therefore completed 128 trials of the 
FCT.   
 A trial consisted of the sequential presentation of face pairs. It began with the display of 
an action on screen for 8000-ms. Following a 400ms interstimulus interval, the target face and 
actor name(randomly determined to be the victim or the perpetrator) appeared and remained on 
screen for 600-ms.  After a 1000-ms interstimulus interval, the sample face appeared for 800 ms. 
Following a 400ms interstimulus interval, the second target face and name (if the first name 
belonged to victim, the perpetrator’s was used or vis-versa) appeared and remained on screen for 
600-ms.  After a 1000-ms interstimulus interval, the sample face appeared for 800 ms.  
 Subjects were instructed to attend only to top part of the face and had 750 ms to decide, 
as fast and accurately as possible, whether these were the same or different.  The target and 
sample faces appeared at slightly different screen locations, to avoid subjects comparing a 
specific location of the display to perform the matching task.  The participants expressed their 
choice by pressing a left versus right key on a keyboard placed in front of them. Same-aligned 
and same-misaligned faces appeared twice as target faces: once in a “same” trial, once in a 
“different” trial. Target and sample faces always differed with regard to their bottom part. In half of 
the trials, the top parts were identical (demanding a “same” response).  In the other half, both top 
and bottom parts differed (demanding a “different” response).  The experiment comprised 64 
experimental trials randomly mixed up across subjects.  
Results 
 Results of study 3 were largely consistent with those of studies 1 and 2.  We conducted a 2 
(alignment: intact, offset) X 2(actor: victim, perpetrator) repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) using the sensitivity index for each of the 4 act-face combinations.  
 Participants showed greater sensitivity at identifying faces of the victim than faces of the 
perpetrator (M=.26, SD=1.3) than the faces of the victim (M=.61, SD=1.1), F(1,53)=32.5, p<.001, η!!  = .389.  Participants had non-significantly greater sensitivity at recognizing offset (M=.51, 
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SD=1.2) than intact faces (M=.37, SD=1.2), F(1,53)=3.76, p=.058, η!!= .07.  Importantly, there 
was a significant interaction between action type and alignment, F(2, 53)=6.80, p=.01, η!!= .12.  
When the actor was a perpetrator participants showed no more sensitivity to intact (M=.30, 
SD=1.3)faces than offset(M=.22, SD=1.3) faces, t(52) = 2.53, p =.99, d’= .07.  However, when the 
actor was a victim participants showed greater sensitivity to offset faces (M=.80, SD=1.1)than 
intact faces(M=.43, SD=1.2) , t(52) = 2.78, p =.004, d’= .35.  
Discussion of Study 3 
Study 3 resolves three important interpretive problems with the previous studies. By 
presenting the information about the actor prior to displaying the face the study controls for 
different amounts of time looking at the face versus the actions.  Second, the study controls for 
the effect of valence.  Because the action is the same across conditions the negativity associated 
with the action cannot drive the difference between conditions.  Thirdly, the study uses a 
perceptual matching task; therefore differences across conditions cannot be driven in recall.   
Finally, the facial composite task directly manipulates holistic processing.  Therefore, 
unlike Studies 1 and 2 where the mechanisms underlying changes are somewhat controversial, 
changes in processing in Study 3 can be more directly attributed to changes in holistic 
processing.  However, it should be noted that this study used a partial design (Gauthier & 
Bukach, 2007; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011).  Concerns have been raised with this version 
of the task, because of a potential problem with response bias. 
Study 4 
 
In this paper, we argue that attenuation of the holistic processing of faces occurs in order 
to facilitate punishment.  Therefore the attenuation of holistic processing should only occur for 
actors whom people desire to punish.   
Prior work on punitiveness suggests that punitive drives are only elicited when the 
perpetrator is seen as culpable (Alicke, 2000) or blameworthy (e.g. Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 
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2014).  We apply the culpable control model to refine our theoretical claims.  The culpable control 
model specifies the conditions under which individuals ascribe blame, such as whether situational 
pressures (e.g., coercion, provocation) or personal incapacities (e.g., ignorance, mental illness) 
are sufficient to excuse conduct blame (Alicke, 2002; Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011).  The model 
postulates that one pathway via which culpability can be reduced is the link between behavior 
and its consequences—or causal control.    
 Study 4 directly manipulates causal by varying only the intention of the action.  The 
theory of perceptual dehumanization therefore predicts a reduction in the face-inversion effect 
only when faces are linked to intentionally, not unintentionally, harmful actions.    
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 204 (98 Male and 106 Female) students at a 
northeastern university who participated in exchange for payment.  Data was collected over a 
one-week period in the Wharton Behavioral lab. Sample size was determined by signup.  The 
average age of participation was 20.5 (stdev .9).    
 Stimuli.  The twenty male face stimuli taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, 
Correll, Witenbrink. 2015) were used to form face composites.  All faces were fitted onto a 256 x 
256 pixel white background and converted to greyscale.  Pairing each target top part with a 
bottom part from another individual created composite faces.  In order to ensure same and 
different trials were identical, randomly paired top and bottom parts from different individuals to 
form both the study and test stimuli.  Luminance of the bottom half of each face, was adjusted to 
match the top half.  Each of the 16 target top parts appeared approximately once in each 
condition. 
 Procedure.  Subjects performed a perceptual matching task in which they indicated if the 
top half of two faces matched.  Prior to each trial of the perceptual matching task, participants 
learned about an intentional or unintentional harm the target perpetrated.   
 All that varied was the use of the word intentional versus accidental in descriptions of the 
act.  Which actions were associated with intentional and unintentional harms was 
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counterbalanced across participants.  For example, when an action appeared as an intentional 
harm “Dylan intentionally shot his brother while hunting” while when the action appeared as an 
unintentional harm it would read, “Dylan unintentionally shot his brother while hunting.”  
 After reading the action, participants performed a perceptual recognition task.  To ensure 
participants associated the face with the action, the name of the actor appeared below the face 
(e.g. “Dylan”).  It began with the display of an action on screen for 800-ms.  Following a 500ms 
interstimulus interval, a face appeared on screen for 400-ms.  After a 1000-ms interstimulus 
interval, the sample face appeared for 800 ms.  To avoid subjects comparing a specific location of 
the display to perform the matching task, the target and sample faces appeared at slightly 
different screen locations.  In half of the trials both the top and bottom half of the target and 
sample face were aligned.  In half of the trials both the top and bottom half of the target and 
sample face were misaligned. 
 Participants had 750 ms to decide, as fast and accurately as possible, whether these 
were the same or different.  The participants expressed their choice by pressing a left versus right 
key on a keyboard placed in front of them.  Same-aligned and same-misaligned faces appeared 
twice as target faces: once in a “same” trial, once in a “different” trial.  Target and sample faces 
always differed with regard to their bottom part.  In half of the trials, the top parts were identical 
(“same”).  In the other half, both top and bottom parts differed (“different”).  Intentional and 
unintentional actions, as well as aligned and misaligned trials were randomly interleaved.  The 
experiment comprised 64 experimental trials randomly mixed up across subjects.  
Results 
 Results of study 4 were largely consistent with the results of study 3.  We conducted a 2 
(alignment: intact, offset) X 2(action: intentional, accidental) repeated measure analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) using the sensitivity index for each of the 4 act-face combinations. Results 
suggests participants were had greater sensitivity at recognizing intact (M=.91, SD=1.3)  than 
offset (M=.46, SD=1.1) faces F(1,200)=135.2, p<.001, η!!= 1.14.  Participants displayed non-
significantly greater sensitivity at identifying faces paired with unintentional than intentional harms 
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F(1,200)=2.076, p=.15.  However, there was a significant interaction between action type and 
alignment, F(2, 199)=28.2, p<.001, η!!  = .28.  When the action was intentional, participants did not 
show different sensitivity to intact (M=.44, SD=1.3) faces than offset (M=.66, SD=1.3) faces, t(52) 
= .48, p =.83, d’= .17.  When the action was unintentional participants showed greater sensitivity 
to offset faces (M=1.42, SD=1.3) than intact faces (M=.34, SD=1.1) , t(52) = 5.43, p <.001, d’= 
.86.  
Discussion of Study 4 
Study 4 links perceptual dehumanization to culpability.  Key to the functionalist argument, 
the attenuation of holistic processing only occurs for actions that people desire to punish.   
Study 5 
 
 Study 5 further tests the social-functionalist claims made in Study 4.  Study 4 
manipulated culpable control by manipulating whether the action was performed accidentally or 
purposefully.  However, the culpable control model postulates another pathway via which 
attributions of responsibility can be reduced: culpability.  The phrase "culpable control" refers to 
the fact that the desire to blame or find someone culpable requires assessments of mental states 
and agentic control over outcomes (“mens rea” in the law).  
 Culpable control suggests that attributions of responsibility are not only dependent on the 
action, but on the actor’s mental state.  As a result, the same action can be interpreted differently 
depending on beliefs about the actor.  In Study 5 we manipulate culpability by altering volitional 
behavioral control.  Specifically, we manipulate participants’ beliefs about the perpetrator’s 
psychological capacity constraints. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 126 (47 Male and 79 Female) students at a northeastern 
university who participated in exchange for course credit. Data was collected over a two-week 
period.  The average age of participation was 19.7 (stdev 1.3) and liberal (mean 4.7 on a 7 point 
scale).   
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Stimuli.  32 face stimuli were take from taken from the KDEF database (Lundqvist, Flykt, 
& Öhman, 1998).  Images were cropped to 250 × 350 pixels and converted to grayscale.  
Procedure.  Prior to completing the recognition memory task, participants read an article 
documenting the genetic and environmental contributions to pedophilia relative to impulsive 
violent behavior.  In one condition, pedophilic behavior was described as highly predetermined 
and impulsive violent behavior was described as highly controllable.  In the other condition 
impulsive violent behavior was described as highly predetermined and pedophilic behavior was 
described as highly controllable.  Following the passage, participants completed a reading 
comprehension check, which if they failed, were reshown the relevant information from the 
passage until they passed.   
After completing the reading comprehension, participants completed a recognition 
memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.  In three blocks, faces were displayed 
intact, and in three blocks faces were offset.  In each block, participants completed a learning 
phase and then a testing phase.  In the learning phase, participants learned 8 face-name/action-
type pairings by simultaneously seeing a single face (either intact or offset) and a single action on 
a screen for 8.5 seconds.  During the test phase, all 8 faces from the learning phase of the block 
were displayed in a single arrangement that remained on screen.  Names appeared serially 
below the face array, and the participant identified the face originally linked to the action in 
learning phase from the array.  
Display order in both the test and recall phase and face-action pairings were fully 
randomized.  Half of the individuals were described “pedophilic” while the other half described 
“violent”.  Action type and names were randomly paired with faces 
Results 
We conducted a 2 (Offset: Intact, Offset) X 2(action: pedophiliac, violent) X 2(condition: 
pedophilia controllable, violence controllable) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) using 
the average response accuracy for each of the 4 act-face combinations.  Results indicate an 
effect of facial offsetting; participants were more accurate at identifying offset than intact (M= .64, 
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SD=.22) than offset (M= .52, SD=.25) faces F(1,124)=129.0, p<.001, η!!=.39.  There was also a 
main effect of action type; participants were more accurate at identifying face-action pairings 
when the action was associated with pedophilia (M= .64, SD=.21) than with violent behavior(M= 
.53, SD=.26) , F(1,124)=33.598, p<.001, η!!=.22.   
There was an unpredicted interaction between action type and condition, 
F(1,124)=33.598, p<.001, η!!=.22.  This interaction was due to participants being more accurate 
at identifying pedophiles when they believed the pedophiles were responsible for their actions 
(M= .68, SD=.21) than when they were told pedophiles they were not responsible for their 
actions, (M= .60 SD=.21)  t(128) = 1.94, p =.028, d’= .25.  
The hypothesized higher-order interaction also emerged among culpability prime, 
alignment and action F(3, 205)=7.3, p=.007, η!! = .055.  Reductions in facial offsetting were 
attenuated by perceived psychological capacity constraints.  When participants believed 
pedophilia was due to a psychological capacity constraint, there was a significant effect of 
offsetting on facial recognition t(52) = 3.76, p <.001, d’= .59.  However, when the pedophilia was 
viewed as controllable, there was no effect of offsetting on facial recognition t(52) = .525, p =.30, 
d’= .14.  Conversely, when participants believed violent behavior was due to a psychological 
capacity constraint, there was a significant effect of offsetting on facial recognition t(52) = 2.8, p 
=.002, d’= .29.  However, when the violent behavior was viewed as controllable there was no 
effect of offsetting on facial recognition t(52) = 5.01, p <.001, d’= .67.  
Discussion 
Study 5 further links perceptual dehumanization to culpability.  Because the actions are 
held constant across conditions, the effects cannot be due to either valence or differences in the 
action or interpretation of the actions.  While in Study 4 the meaning of the actions may vary 
across conditions, in Study 5 only culpability varies across conditions.  The results suggest that 
perceived culpable control moderates perceptual effects.  
Study 6 
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      Results from Studies 1 to 5 suggest that norm violation leads to changes in visual processing 
of faces.  Studies 6A and 6B directly link perceptual dehumanization to an increased willingness 
to punish.  These studies test the impact of the manipulations of perceptual dehumanization used 
in studies 1 and 2 on punitive decisions.   
Study 6A 
Method. 
Participants.  Participants were 225 (125 Male and 100 Female) American workers on 
Mechanical Turk who participated for $1.00 payment. Based upon funding constraints the sample 
size was predetermined to be 225.   
Stimuli.  60 face stimuli were take from Ballew and Todorov (2007).  Our images were 
restricted to while male runner-ups.  Images were cropped to 150 × 215 pixels, placed on a 
standard background, and converted to grayscale. 
Procedure.  Participants rated the appropriate punishment for 15 upright and 15 inverted 
face-action pairings on a unique 13-point scale adopted from the justice-research literature 
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; John M Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2001).  It ranged 
from “No sentence” to “Death sentence” with non-linear intervals given in weeks, months, and 
years of incarceration.  The norm violations were taken from studies 1 and 2. Actions were 
randomly assigned to faces for each participant.  Additionally, orientation of faces was randomly 
determined for each participant.  
Results.  We conducted a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) X (Block Order: Upright first, 
Inverted First) mixed model ANOVA on punitiveness.  There was a significant effect of inversion 
on punitiveness, with inverted faces receiving significantly harsher punishments than upright 
faces, F(1,222)=64.8, p<.001, η!!  = .06.  This suggests inhibition of holistic processing may 
function to increase the punitive drive.   
Study 6B 
Study 6A suggests that impairing holistic processing increases punitiveness.  However, 
the effects in Study 6A may be due to victim identifiability.  Therefore, Study 6B tested whether 
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increasing holistic processing (by removing high frequency spatial information) reduces 
punitiveness.  Because this study predicts the opposite pattern of results, it rules out the 
possibility that the processing manipulations are simply reducing the identifiability of victims and 
therefore increasing punitiveness.   
Method. 
Participants.  Participants were 225 (117 Male and 108 Female) American Masters 
workers on Mechanical Turk who participated for $1.00 payment.  Based upon funding 
constraints the sample size was predetermined to be 225.   
Stimuli.  30 neutral expression male faces were taken from the KDEF database 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, , & Öhman, 1998).  The faces were Fourier transformed and multiplied by high-
pass Gaussian filters that preserved low (< 8 cycles/face width) spatial frequencies (see Figure 
1.2).  Full spectrum (FS) faces were also used. 
Procedure. Participants rated the appropriate punishment for 15 upright and 15 blurry 
face-action pairing on a 13-point scale adopted from the justice-research literature(Carlsmith et 
al., 2002; John M Darley et al., 2001).  30 norm violations were randomly selected from studies 
1and 2.  Which actions were paired with upright or inverted faces were counter-balanced across 
participants to control for differences across actions.  
Results.  A 2 (Spatial frequency: Low only, High and low) X (Block Order: Upright first, 
Inverted First) repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant effect of blurring on punitiveness, 
with low frequency faces receiving significantly more lenient punishments than normal faces, 
F(1,222)=53.2, p<.001, η!!= .12.  Consistent with the results of Study 6A, this again suggests 
inhibition of holistic processing may function to increase the punitive drive.    
Discussion 
Studies 6A and 6B directly link perceptual dehumanization to an increased willingness to 
punish.  As illustrated by Figure 1.4, inverted faces and low spatial frequency faces have opposite 
effects on punitiveness.  Study 6A impairs typical face processing and demonstrates that 
impairments in face processing increase punitiveness.  Study 6B impairs holistic processing and 
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demonstrates that impairments in holistic processing decrease punitiveness.  Importantly, 
although both studies 6A and 6B both distort faces, in line with our predictions they push 
punitiveness in opposite directions.  
Study 7 
 
Study 6 tested the impact of impairing processing via overt manipulations of facial 
process.  Study 7 builds on these prior studies by impairing facial processing in a manner 
routinely used in real punishment: blindfolding the recipient of collectively mandated corporal or 
capital punishment.  Additionally, rather than measuring punitive drive we measure desire to stop 
punishment – a more realistic measure of how ordinary individuals respond emotionally to 
punitive behavior.    
Study 7A 
Method. 
Participants.  Participants were 78 (98 Male and 51 Female) American workers on 
Mechanical Turk.  Participants were paid $1.00 in exchange for completion of the survey.  The 
average time of completion was about 10 minutes.  Data was collected over a five-hour period.  
Sample size was predetermined to be 150.  The average age of participation was 31.9 (SD 8.8) 
and liberal (mean 4.5 on a 7 point scale, SD 1.5).   
Stimuli.  4 high-resolution pictures of 2 punitive practices with exposed faces were 
collected from various Internet sources (e.g., CNN, Wikipedia, and local media sources).  The 
image of each politician was cropped to 550 × 350 pixels and placed on a standard background.  
A graphic artist was hired to make images appear as though each individual was wearing a 
blindfold or a gag.   
Procedure.  We measured opposition to cruel and inhumane punitive practices by a self-
report, using a between-subject design.  Participants read a brief description of four different 
punitive practices— flogging, electrocution, beheading, and hanging. Following the description of 
each practice, participants viewed a photograph of the practice.  Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of three conditions.  In one condition, the faces of the individuals’ depicted in the 
photograph were randomly assigned to have their eyes covered by a blindfold.  In the second 
condition, the faces of the individuals’ depicted in the photograph were randomly assigned to 
have their mouth covered by a gag.  In the final condition, the individuals’ face was fully exposed.   
The photograph remained on screen for at least ten seconds.  Punitive practices 
appeared in a randomly determined order.  After viewing each photograph, participants rated the 
degree to which they found the punishment morally reprehensible.  We measured this belief by 
asking participants the degree to which they agreed with the statement, ”This form of punishment 
is morally reprehensible”, on a visual analog scale ranging from 0  (Strongly Disagree) to 10 scale 
(Strongly Agree).  
Results.  We conducted a 3 (Covering: blindfold, gag, none) X 3(punishment type: 
flogging, beheading, hanging) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the self-reported 
moral condemnation.  
In line with our predictions, obscuring the face of the punished individual significantly 
reduced condemnation of the punishment F(2, 146)=3.77, p=.025, η!!=.049.  Participants 
condemned punishment significantly less when the individual was blindfolded (M=5.5, SD=2.6), 
than when he was gagged (M=7.1, SD=2.9), t(98) = 2.06, p =.022, d’= .51 or when his entire face 
was exposed(M=7.2, SD=2.8), t(207) = 2.03, p =.024,  d’= .48.  There was no significant 
difference in reaction to the gagged individual and the individual with the fully exposed face, 
t(207) = 1.42, p =.92, d’= .03.   
There was a significant effect punishment type on donations, F(2, 146) = 5.86,  p=.003, 𝜂!!=.039.  Participants expressed the greatest condemnation for beheading (M =7.0, SD = 3.2) 
and the least condemnation for [[??]] (M = 6.3, SD = 3.4).  There was also a significant interaction 
between punishment and covering F(4, 146)=2.85, p=.024, η!! =    .012.  This appears to be driven 
by the impact of gagging on flogging.  [[]] Gagging condition significantly reduced condemnation 
of flogging.  This effect was also unpredicted. 
Study 7B 
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Method. 
Participants. Participants were 213 (88 Male and 120 Female) students at a 
northeastern university who participated in exchange for payment.  Data was collected over a 
one-week period in the Wharton Behavioral lab.  Sample size was determined by signup.  The 
average age of participation was 19.9 (SD= .8) and liberal (M= 5.0 on a 7 point scale).   
Stimuli.  10 high-resolution pictures of 8 punitive practices with exposed faces were 
collected from various Internet sources (e.g., CNN, Wikipedia, and local media sources).  The 
image of each politician was cropped to 550 × 350 pixels and placed on a standard background.  
A graphic artist was hired to make images appear as though each individual was wearing a 
blindfold.   
Procedure.  We measured opposition to cruel and inhumane punitive practices using a 
donation task in a within-subject design.  Participants read a brief description of five different 
punitive practices—flogging, caning, electrocution, beheading, and hanging—all of which were 
selected because they are not only brutal but also still practiced in various parts of the world.  
Following the description of each practice, participants viewed a photograph of the practice.  In 
the photograph, the individual depicted was randomly assigned to have his eyes covered by a 
blindfold or eyes exposed.  The photograph remained on screen for at least ten seconds.  
Practices appeared in a random order.   
 Following exposure to all five practices, participants completed a donation task.  
Participants were given 50 tokens (equivalent to $5.00).  Participants could allocate the tokens in 
any proportion they chose among six different options.  Each form of punishment was associated 
with a unique fund to which they could donate tokens for the purpose of stopping that specific 
form punishment.  The sixth option allowed them to keep as many tokens as they wanted for 
themselves.  The order of options was randomized across participants.   
Results. We treated each rating as an observation and conducted a mixed-model 
ANOVA that treated type of punishment as a random effect.  As illustrated in Figure 1.5, a 2 
(Eyes: exposed, not exposed) X 5(punishment type: flogging, canning, electrocution, beheading, 
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hanging) ANOVA revealed a significant effect punishment type on donations, F(4, 105) = 53.42,  
p< .0001.  The most money was donated to stop beheading (M = $1.30, SD =$1.00) and the least 
was donated to stop electrocution (M =$0.53, SD =$0.48).  Importantly there was a significant 
effect of eye treatment: when the eyes were exposed significantly more money was donated to 
stop the punishment (M = $0.90, SD =$0.50) than when the eyes were not exposed (M= $0.70, 
SD = $0.51), F(l, 107) = 14.17,  p< .0001, d’=.4.   
This effect was not driven by a reallocation of donations across punishments, but by 
keeping less money for oneself.  Exposed eyes lead to greater donations across the board.  The 
images with exposed eyes one saw, the less money one kept for oneself, t(109) = - 3.41, p < 
.001.     
Study 7C 
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 78 (42 Male and 46 Female) American workers on 
Mechanical Turk.  Participants were paid $1.00 in exchange for completion of the survey.  The 
average time of completion was about 2 minutes.  Data was collected over a two-hour period.  
Sample size was determined by signup.  The average age of participation was 35.5 (SD 12.3) 
and liberal (mean 4.7 on a 7 point scale, SD 1.4).   
Stimuli.  8 high-resolution pictures of 4 punitive practices with exposed faces were 
collected from various Internet sources (e.g., CNN, Wikipedia, and local media sources).  The 
image of each politician was cropped to 550 × 350 pixels and placed on a standard background.  
Faces were manipulated to appear in low spatial frequency (as in studies 2 and 6)   
Procedure.  We measured opposition to cruel and inhumane punitive practices by a self-
report, using a between-subject design.  Participants read a brief description of two different 
punitive practices: flogging and caning.  Following the description of each practice, participants 
viewed a photograph of the practice.  For half of the participants the faces of the punished 
individuals were altered using a high spatial frequency filter, such that the face was displayed in 
Low spatial frequency.  The other half of participants viewed unaltered photographs.  The 
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photograph remained on screen for at least ten seconds.  Practices appeared in a random order.  
After viewing each photograph, participants rated the degree to which they found the punishment 
morally reprehensible.  We measured this belief by asking participants the degree to which they 
agreed with the statement, ”This form of punishment is morally reprehensible” on a visual analog 
scale ranging from 0  (Strongly Disagree) to 10 scale (Strongly Agree).  
Results.  We conducted a 2 (Spatial Frequency: Broad Spatial Frequency, Low Spatial 
Frequency) X 2(Punishment: caning, flogging) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), using 
the self-reported moral condemnation as the dependent variable.  Given the similarity between 
flogging and caning, as one would expect there was no significance different between flogging 
(M=7.2, SD= 3.2) and caning (M=7.3, SD= 3.2), F(1, 76)=.217, p=.642.  
In line with our predictions, participants condemned punishment significantly more when 
the faces were displayed in LSF (M=7.4, SD=2.8) than in BSF (M=6.1, SD=3.5), F(1, 86)=7.36, 
p=.01, η!!=.088.  There was no significant interaction between punishment and spatial frequency 
F(2, 76)=.044, p=.834. 
Discussion 
Study 7A demonstrates that while both the mouth and the eyes are central to identifying 
emotions and are equally identifiable facial features, blindfolding leads to significantly less 
condemnation of punishment.  Study 7B uses real economic incentives to demonstrate blindfolds 
have an effect on real world behavior.  Study 7c demonstrates this is not simply due to distortion 
of the faces because the opposite effect occurs when the faces are displayed in LSF.  
Blindfolding or even complete covering the faces of those about to be executed is 
practiced across a wide range of cultures whereas gagging is not widely practiced.  If one is 
willing to make the functionalist assumption that these practices serve to reduce the stressfulness 
of the experience of the executioners and to reduce public empathy for perpetrators, these 
observations provide informal real-world validation of the perceptual dehumanization 
framework—and converge with the results of Study 6A and 6B.   
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General Discussion 
 
Seven studies yielded substantial support for the key predictions of the theory of 
Percpeutal Dehumanization.  The results of seven studies suggest that humans visually process 
the faces of norm violators atypically and that these automatic changes in perception act to 
facilitate punitive behavior.  Studies 1-5 use a multi-method array of techniques to produce 
convergent evidence that the visual mechanisms that enable the processing of faces are inhibited 
upon learning someone is a norm violator.  
A clear advantage of the perception literature is its emphasis on mechanism, which 
makes it easier than in much of social psychology to pinpoint the exact strengths as well as 
confounds in any particular paradigm.  In Table 1.1, we outline the offsetting strengths and 
weaknesses of each paradigm we used.  Although each individual paradigm is potentially 
problematic, alternative artifactual explanations can be rendered implausible across these 
methodologically diverse studies.  Weighing the entirety of the evidence, our results demonstrate 
impairment in the face typical processing of norm violators—an attenuation in holistic processing. 
Readers familiar with the history of experimental psychology will recognize a 
resemblance between our findings and controversies dating back to the 1950s on the conditions 
under which social processes can influence perceptual processes (Bruner & Goodman, 1947).  
The controversies centered on two issues: (1) replicability and (2) the possibility that effects are 
due to response threshold shifts (or response biases), rather than perceptual shifts. We have 
shown replicability across different manipulations of perceptual processing (see table 1.1), and 
across different types of facial and contextual parameters by manipulating display timing and 
display size. And we have taken a key step to eliminate response bias by designing a task in 
such a way that response bias cannot influence key variables.  Response bias would be 
problematic if the independent variables (facial orientation and action valence) had been the 
response variable (and participants had been selecting an action to match a particular face). In 
studies 1, 2 and 5, faces were randomized across actions and perceptual manipulation, and 
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responses were uncorrelated with the main and interactive effects of the independent variables. A 
response bias would take the form of a bias toward particular types of faces. In these studies, 
faces were randomized across all other dimensions, rendering systematic response bias a very 
unlikely counter-explanation. 
Studies 3 through 5 underscore that that these attenuations of facial processing are 
specific to norm violators.  Study 3 controls for valence as a potential confound by using same 
actions across conditions and only varying the role faces are assigned (victim or perpetrator).  
Study 4 and 5 more stringently test the functionalist logic of Perceptual Dehumanization by 
applying Alicke’s  model (2000) of culpable control and manipulating the degree to which 
observer see perpetrators as  blameworthy.  Study 4 reduces causal control by changing intent.  
Study 5 reduces behavioral control by altering mental capacity.  The results of these studies are 
consistent with the functionalist hypothesis that perceptual dehumanization effects are driven by 
the desire to punish.  
The results of Studies 6 and 7 establish a functionalist link between face processing and 
punishment.  In Study 6, directly manipulating face processing suggests that face-typical 
processing reduces the ability to punish.  Study 7 examines these effects in the context of visual 
depictions of punishment.  Consistently, face-typical processing appears to impair punitive drives.  
The most parsimonious explanation is that changes in face processing serves the social function 
of facilitating the punishment of norm violators.  We posit this mechanism enables individuals to 
satisfy conflicting demands imposed by the complexities of social interdependency: the need to 
get along and cooperate and the need to deter norm violations.  
Human societies—unlike those of most other species—are based on large-scale 
cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals.  As in other species, the social world of our 
ancestors contained individuals who were poised to exploit others if such acts were self-beneficial 
(Daly & Wilson, 1988; Duntley, 2005; Duntley & Buss, 2004).  A sustainable social order requires 
beings that can switch readily between cooperation and punitiveness. Indeed, laboratory 
experiments and formal models alike suggest that the cooperative equilibria critical to human 
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social groupings would be impossible without tit-for-tat rules and third-party punishment of norm 
violators (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Nowak, 2006). 
A larger issue lurking in the background of this article is just how punitive are people.  
There are alternative views in the social psychological literature (e.g. Tetlock, 2002).  Here we 
have worked from the assumption that people (at least in affluent Western societies) are mostly 
reluctant intuitive prosecutors whose default reaction is to feel each other’s pain and who must 
switch that off to do their social duty and punish norm violators. This assumption is consistent 
with a good deal of work in developmental and social psychology (Tetlock et al., 2007; Hamlin, 
Wynn & Bloom, 2007).  
Alternatively, one could make the opposite argument that empathy is required to 
overcome the natural tendency toward punitiveness. For example, one could posit that on a cost-
benefit analysis, it would make greater survival sense for organisms to assume harmful actions or 
intentions and then to correct when this turns out to be untrue, than to begin with empathy and 
then have to overcome it.  This possibility is consistent with our data; it would suggest that 
individual’s default is to not engage in face specific processing and it is only when empathic 
processes are engaged that individuals do so.  Past research on face processing suggests the 
possibility that “face-specific” processing in not the default processing of human faces (Van 
Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 2011). 
It is also important to pre-empt confusion that may arise from our using the term 
“perceptual dehumanization” which may encourage conflation with the larger literature in social-
political psychology on dehumanization.  Several prominent theorists have identified the social 
construct of dehumanization as a possible mechanism that facilitates harming others.  Opotow 
(1990) posited that dehumanization allows people to be placed outside the boundary beyond 
which moral rules apply.   Bandura proposed that dehumanization is one way in which moral self-
sanctions are selectively disengaged.  Similarly, according to Kelman (1973), when people are 
divested of these agentic and communal aspects of humanity they lose the capacity to evoke 
compassion and moral emotions. 
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The present research suggests perceptual dehumanization, like the social-psychological 
construct, acts to facilitate harm.  However, unlike the social-psychological construct, perceptual 
dehumanization does not require endorsing negative stereotypes of the target group and likely 
functions with less awareness and on a more rapid time scale.  Indeed, we propose that one 
mechanism for inhibiting cooperative impulses and facilitating punishment is rapid-fire shifts in the 
perceptual categorization of norm violators, in which the faces of norm violators cease to be 
processed in face-typical ways.   
Although we argue that perceptual dehumanization acts to facilitate punishment, 
perceptual dehumanization may function more broadly than just applying to norm violators.  For 
example, prior research has demonstrated that there is an attenuation in face-specific processing 
of individuals of other races (e.g. Michel et al., 2006) and out-group members (e.g. MacLin & 
Malpass, 2003).  Table 1.2 lays out these potential parallels between the perceptual literature on 
perceptual attenuation of holistic processing and the social psychological literature on 
dehumanization and discrimination.  
Notably, Bernard, Gervais, Allen, Campomizzi, and Klein (2012) report an inversion effect 
only when participants viewed sexualized male body images, but not when they viewed 
sexualized female body images, and they link these perceptual changes to sexual objectification. 
In the case of work on gender, Tarr (2013) provides an interesting counter explanation that 
effects are stimulus driven because female poses was more asymmetric than male.  To the 
degree this explanation is correct, it raises the provocative possibility that cultural norms evolved 
in a manner that attenuate the holistic processing of less valued of subordinate groups.  There is 
a potential parallel here between this argument and the one we advance with respect to 
blindfolds.   
Because the attenuation of face-typical processing applies broadly, including even to 
minimal (experimentally created) groups, this may suggest an asymmetry between perceptual 
dehumanization and more explicit forms of dehumanization.  We suspect that the relationship is 
asymmetric: it is possible to perceptually dehumanize without engaging in the explicit hatred or 
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derogation of social-psychological dehumanization but it is probably impossible to engage in 
nasty overt dehumanization without the subtle assistance of perceptual dehumanization. In short, 
our larger and more speculative claim is that perceptual dehumanization is a necessary but far 
from sufficient condition for dehumanization as that term is used in the social psychological 
literature. 
Finally, we should note an important boundary condition on when perceptual 
dehumanization will facilitate norm enforcement.  Observers' moral reactions to the phenomenon 
will hinge on their beliefs about the legitimacy of the social systems enforcing the norms.  For 
instance, most Americans would probably deem perceptual dehumanization beneficial if it 
enabled killing domestic terrorists, but repugnant if it enabled Islamic fundamentalists to stone 
women who have been convicted of adultery. Regardless, our results suggest that the same 
perceptual dehumanizing process underlies these two examples.  
In sum, our results reveal previously experimentally unexplored connections across 
levels of analyses, between the more macro social phenomena of punishment to the more micro 
mechanisms of face perception.  Our data also potentially bridge neuro-cognitive work on facial 
and object perception with social psychological work on norm enforcement and punitiveness.  
Perceptual dehumanization suggests that crucial adaptations to group life, such as our capacity 
to enforce norms essential for reaching and maintaining cooperative equilibria, are internalized at 
a surprisingly basic perceptual-cognitive level of human mental functioning.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces of Society’s Defenders: The Social Function of 
Attenuations in the Holistic Processing of Faces 
 
 Visual representations of dehumanization abound, be it the treatment of women in 
advertising, the caricatures of enemies during wars or the derogation of groups preceding 
genocides (Hirgo, 2007; Sells, 1996; Steuter & Wills, 2009).  Nonetheless, prior work has not 
linked these social-political forms of dehumanization to visual processing. The current article 
makes this linkage: it connects traditional social-psychological theorizing on the functions of 
dehumanization with an emerging work on the distinctive perceptual processes implicated in the 
encoding and processing of information about human faces.  
 Recent research suggests that these perceptual processes that are typically engaged 
when one human being looks at the face of another human being are highly sensitive to the 
surrounding social context (Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Ge & Pascalis, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, 
Chung, & Caldara, 2006; MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 2003). We define perceptual dehumanization 
as the short-circuiting of face-typical information processing.  Consistent with the connotative 
implication of this terminology, thus far, research has documented a tight linkage between the 
groups that people perceptually dehumanize and groups that suffer the social costs of 
dehumanization.  Further work has experimentally demonstrated that these perceptual changes 
facilitate the infliction of harm on deviants and out-groups (Fincher & Tetlock, 2015).  However, 
the research to date is insufficient to determine whether perceptual dehumanization is simply a 
basic psychological process identical in its range of application to social-psychological 
dehumanization or a process that occurs in a wider range of social situations than those normally 
associated with dehumanization as that term has been used for decades in the research 
literature. 
In the current work, we show that “perceptual dehumanization” is not functionally 
interchangeable with classical forms of dehumanization.  Our results suggest that “perceptual 
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dehumanization” is functionally distinct from other forms of dehumanization.  Specifically, unlike 
other forms of dehumanization (for a review see Haslam, 2006), the perceptual denial of 
humanness occurs in a broader range of circumstances—and extends even to individuals who 
are honored within the in-group but who are also asked to make ultimate sacrifices on behalf of 
the in-group, as is asked of law enforcement or military officers. This suggests that 
dehumanization, at least at a perceptual level, is not linked to stigmatization or negative attitudes.  
And from a functionalist perspective, this suggests that Perceptual Dehumanization may have 
emerged not only to facilitate the infliction of harm but also, more generally, to inhibit the impulse 
to help and thereby facilitate strategic forms of callousness.  
Classic work on dehumanization focuses on explicit and brutal stereotyping and 
mistreatment, such as depicting target groups as rats or cockroaches that must be exterminated 
or indeed taking action against those groups to exterminate them (Ervin, 1989; Kelman, 1973; 
Lifton, 2000). More recently, researchers have explored infrahumanization, which is a subtler but 
still demeaning form of dehumanization (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 
2007; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010).  
Infrahumanization operationalizes dehumanization as the denial of the affective features of 
humanity – specifically the denial of secondary human emotions, such as regret and nostalgia 
that are linked to self-awareness (e.g., nostalgia, humiliation; Leyens et al., 2003).   
These seemingly disparate operationalizations of dehumanization are linked through their 
social function: that dehumanization makes it easier for people to harm those they see as threats 
to the social order.  Kelman (1973) and Bar-Tal (2000) invoke dehumanization to explain the 
Nazi’s capacity to slaughter Jews whom they saw as betrayers of Germany in World War I.  
Opotow’s (1990) work on “moral exclusion,” treats dehumanization as a process of categorizing 
people so they no longer fall inside the boundary where moral rules apply.   Similarly, Bandura 
(1999) also treats dehumanization as a way of selectively disengaging moral self-sanctions.  
Work on infrahumanization builds upon this view.  Building on work on the omission bias and 
casuistry, infrahumanzation researchers have shown that failures to attribute secondary emotions 
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are associated with the passive infliction of harm such as failures to aid the infrahumanized 
African American victims of Katrina.    
 Dehumanization is typically operationalized as a denial of the cognitive and affective 
features of humanness.  However, in addition to these explicit markers of humanity, there are 
subtler implicit markers of “humanness”.  A large body of work suggests that human faces (and 
even bodies) evoke holistic processing.  As a consequence, the denial of holistic processing, 
represents a denial of the perceptual features of humanness (Fincher & Tetlock, 2015).  
People are particularly skilled at recognizing faces.  A preference for face-like stimuli 
appears to be innate: newborns preferentially orient toward stimuli with face-like first-order 
relations (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Mondloch, Lewis, Budreau, Maurer, 
Dannemiller, Stephens, & Kleiner-Gathercoal, 1999).  This innate face preference translates into 
heightened perceptual acuity in adults (Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011).  Adults can 
hundreds, if not thousands of individuals quickly, as long as the presentation of the person is not 
disrupted by inversion or other manipulations (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). 
 These striking skills are all the more impressive when we consider that facial features are 
arranged in similar configurations on all human faces, which means that subtle differences in 
features and their spatial relations are necessary for discriminating among faces. To facilitate 
extraction of configural information, people process faces holistically, as evidenced by the fact 
that it is more difficult to ignore part of a face than part of an object (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & 
Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). 
 The concept of holistic processing is a cornerstone of face-recognition research. Neuro-
cognitive researchers have amassed convincing evidence that holistic processing is distinct from 
other forms of perceptual processing; certain regions of the brain are dedicated to holistic 
processing (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998); and individuals with prosopagnosia show 
selective impairment in the holistic processing of faces (Ramon, Busigny & Rossion, 2010; 
Tanaka & Farah, 2003).  
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 A recent body of research suggests that certain types of social information attenuate the 
holistic processing of faces of a large number of socially disfavorable groups (e.g. MacLin & 
Malpass, 2001, 2003). Most famously, the holistic facial processing is disrupted when observers 
view the faces of disadvantaged racial groups (e.g. Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, and Caldara, 
2006). Although a provocative finding given the large body of research on the mistreatment of 
individuals of other races, this Other Race Effect (ORE) is not necessarily due to social 
modulation of perceptual effects.  Because the facial stimuli used in these studies inevitably differ 
as a function of race, race effects can be attributed to a number of bottom-up informational 
explanations.   
 However, recent findings suggest that these effects may be modulated by social 
motives1.  Group affiliation may be in itself sufficient to elicit changes in processing as indexed by 
facial inversion (Bernstein, Young & Hugenberg, 2007), facial composite task (Hugenberg & 
Corneille, 2009), neural activity in the face selective region the fusiform face area (Van Bavel, 
Packer& Cunningham, 2011) and the N170 an ERP component associated with face-processing 
(Ratner & Amodio, 2013).  Further, the attenuation of face-typical perceptual processing has been 
observed in reactions to sexualized females (Bernard, Gervais, Allen, Campomizzi, &  Klein 
2012) and subordinate social groups (Shriver, Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, and Lanter, 2008).   
 Even more recently, in a series of studies examining the perceptual processing of norm 
violators, Fincher and Tetlock (2015) proposed a theory of Perceptual Dehumanization. Fincher 
and Tetlock take a social functionalist approach and argue that the facial processing of norm 
violators is selectively attenuated and that this attenuation in facial processing facilitates punitive 
behavior. This work builds upon classic accounts of dehumanization and suggests that perceptual 
dehumanization functions to facilitate the infliction of harm.  
It is interesting to note that the attenuation of face-typical processing occurs in a broad 
range of circumstances, even in minimal groups (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Van Bavel, 
Packer& Cunningham, 2011). This suggests perceptual dehumanization arises in situations 
where there minimal stigmatization or motivation to harm.  One possibility raised by this pattern of 
	  35	  
	  
data is that perceptual dehumanization is linked more to the inhibition of helping than to the 
activation of aggression, the hallmark of dehumanization.  
Distinguishing these two possibilities can be difficult.  Most evolutionary and social-
exchange-theory perspectives suggest that people are least inclined to help those seen as 
lacking moral character, norm violators of one form or another  But there are instances when 
these two possibilities can be disambiguated.  If our theoretical claim is correct, there are inter-
group functions (military protection against external aggressors) that may require sacrificing 
valued in-group members. To protect the group as a whole, people must sometimes deny 
honored civil servants the concern normally accorded in-group members. For example, soldiers 
are voluntarily sent into harm’s way to protect society’s interests, ideals, and citizens.   The 
welfare of these individuals is subordinated to the welfare of society at large.  
 We propose that in the cases of both honored civil servants and stigmatized groups, 
people use similar perceptual mechanisms to inhibit the helping response.  Specifically, H1 posits 
that: 
If dehumanization acts to inhibit helping behavior, we should expect perceptual shifts in 
reactions not only to norm violators but also highly valued civil servants who are seen as 
“necessary to sacrifice” for the greater good. 
The norm-enforcement prediction is the less controversial part of H1 and it has already been 
demonstrated on multiple occasions (Fincher & Tetlock, 2015). But the more controversial 
component of H1 has not been tested. This article will therefore focus on the effects of perceptual 
dehumanization on highly valued civil servants.   
The socio-functionalist logic of perceptual dehumanization inhibiting helping for the greater good, 
suggests that perceptual dehumanization will facilitate utilitarian behavior. In the case of high-
status but sacrificial actors, perceptual dehumanization will make sacrifices easier. H2 posits that:  
Impairments in face-specific processing should increase willingness to sacrifice 
individuals for the greater good.   
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 This article tests two key functionalist claims derived from the theory of Perceptual 
Dehumanization: (1) perceptual dehumanization spontaneously occurs when aggregate social 
welfare requires indifference toward the well-being of the actor; (2) perceptual dehumanization 
facilitates behavioral responses inline with greater social welfare.  Studies 1-4 use a multi-method 
array of techniques to test the breath of dehumanization by examining if individuals 
spontaneously attenuate perceptual processing of both norm violators and civil servants in high 
risk roles. Studies 5 and 6 examine whether these perceptual changes translate into behavioral 
changes.  
Study 1 
 
 If dehumanization only facilitates violence, we should only observe perceptual shifts for 
low-status/stigmatized groups.  But if dehumanization inhibits empathic concern, we should 
expect perceptual shifts not only for norm violators but also for highly valued civil servants who 
are seen as “necessary to sacrifice” for the greater good.  To disentangle these possibilities we 
examined the degree to which three groups were perceptually dehumanized: police officers (who 
risked their lives to save others), convicts, and ordinary citizens.  
Participants 
 Participants were 239 (127 females) undergraduates at a northeastern university 
completed the study in individual computer terminals and were each paid $12. The average age 
of participation was 20.1 (SD = 1.0).  Participants reported that their political attitudes were liberal 
(M = 5.3 on a 7 point scale). Participants were recruited through a behavioral lab on campus. The 
study ran for 1 week and the number of sign-up volunteers during that time period determined 
sample size.   
Methods 
 Stimuli. Computer generated faces, of average trustworthiness (see Todorov, Dotsch, 
Porter, Oosterhof, & Falvello, 2013) were used the memory task.  Social category was 
	  37	  
	  
manipulated by presenting the faces from the chest up, dressed in either a police uniform, a 
convict uniform or plain blue t-shirt – faces were randomly assigned to social group.  
 Procedure. We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.  
The key manipulations were the social category with which the face was associated (police, 
citizen, criminal) and the orientation of the face (upright, inverted).  
 For each participant, the experiment consisted of eight blocks, each consisting of 10 
face–name pairings. In four blocks, faces appeared upright during both the study and test 
phases; in four blocks, the faces appear as inverted during both the study and test phases.  To 
control for difficulty or learning effects, the order of blocks was randomized across participants.  
Names were randomly assigned to faces. Face-name pairings were randomly assigned to blocks.  
Names were taken from the social security websites 100 most common names of 1988. 
 Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase. During the study phase, the 10 
face-name pairings were shown in a random order for 12.5 seconds each.   During the test 
phase, names were shown in a random order below an array consisting of all 10 faces.   
Participants were asked to identify the correct face from the array by indicating the number 
associated with the face.   Face arrays were created by randomly assigning each of the 10 faces 
a number.   
Results  
 We conducted a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) X 3(group: police, citizen, criminal) 
repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each 
of the 6 group-face combinations. As shown in Figure 2.1, results replicated the face inversion 
effect. Participants were more accurate at identifying upright (M= .76, SD= .12) than inverted 
faces (M= .47, SD= .15), F(1,232)=165.5, p<.001, η!!  = 1.12. People were also significantly more 
accurate at identifying face name pairings for police (M= .63, SD=.14) and criminals(M= .66, 
SD=.14) than ordinary citizens(M= .56, SD=.16), F(2,232)=5.28, p=.006, η!!  = .18. 
 The hypothesized interaction between orientation and group also emerged, 
F(2,232)=12.31, p<.001, η!!  = .29.  Participants were less accurate at identifying inverted faces 
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paired with ordinary citizens than inverted faces paired with police officers, t(232) = 3.6, p < .001 
or criminals t(232) = 7.4, p < .001. However, they were not more accurate at identifying upright 
faces paired with police officers, t(232) = . 54, p =.71. or convicts, t(232) = .892, p =.18.  The 
reduction in the face-inversion effect when faces for both police and criminals suggest that 
perceptual dehumanization occurs for both categorizes of individuals.   
 Criminals elicited greater perceptual dehumanization effects than did police officers. We 
conducted a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) X2 (group: police, citizen) repeated measure 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for the 4 relevant group-face 
combinations.  The interaction between orientation and group was significant, F(2,232)=8.07, 
P=.005. Participants were more accurate at identifying inverted faces paired with police than 
criminals t(232) = 2.07, p=.02, but not more accurate at identifying upright faces paired with police 
t(232) = .89, p =.18. 
Discussion of Study 1 
 In Study 1 we observed perceptual shifts not only for norm violators (replicating past 
work) but also civil servants seen as “necessary to sacrifice” for the greater good. The reduction 
in the facial inversion effect for both cops and convicts suggests that participants were no longer 
processing the faces of either group as they process other human faces.  This pattern of results 
suggest that dehumanization, or at least a denial of perceptual humanness, is rooted in the 
inhibition of concern rather than motivating harm. Although the specific mechanisms underlying 
the facial inversion effect remain a topic of active debate (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987), from a 
social psychological perspective, it is the atypicality that matters most, not the exact character of 
the perceptual mechanism. 
 Interestingly, police officers were not perceptually dehumanized to the same degree as 
criminals.  This may be a property of the particular stimulus or suggest that inhibitions of helping 
and harming result in different degrees of perceptual dehumanization.  
Study 2 
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 Study 1 found that people perceptually dehumanized both police and criminals.  Study 2 
addresses two potential confounds: (1) the dehumanization of police could be due to a carryover 
effect of negative attitudes toward government (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977); (2) the dehumanization 
of both police and convicts could be triggered by their uniforms (Diener, Dineen, Endresen, 
Beaman, & Fraser, 1975; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Rehm, Steinleitner, & Lilli, 1987; 
Zimbardo, 1969).  Study 2 corrects these problems in two ways.  Instead of using police offices, 
the study uses Army officers—and instead of using ordinary individuals as a control, we used 
uniformed government employees in a low risk job (thus controlling for the effect of uniforms).  In 
order to provide converge validity, Study 2 manipulates holistic processing through offsetting the 
faces. 
Participants 
      Participants were 227 (115 Male) workers on Mechanical Turk who participated for a $5.00 
payment.  The sample was constrained to be American to reduce ambiguity in social symbols.  
The average age of participation was 40.7 (SD=11.9), lower-middle class (M=2.4 on a 5 point 
scale), and slightly liberal (M=4.4 on a 7 point scale).   
Methods  
 Stimuli. We again used computer generated faces of average likability and 
trustworthiness (see Todorov, Dotsch, Porter, Oosterhof, & Falvello, 2013).  Faces were 
randomly assigned to a social category was manipulated by presenting the faces from the chest 
up, dressed in either a military uniform, a convict uniform or postal officer uniform.   Half of the 
faces were offset, so that the top and bottom half of the face were misaligned by 250 pixels. 
 Procedure.  We used a similar memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.  
The manipulations of interest were the social category with which the face was associated 
(soldier, postal worker, criminal).  Visual processing was manipulated using alignment of the face 
(intact, offset).  
 For every participant, the experiment consisted of eight blocks, each consisting of 6 face–
name pairings. In four blocks, faces appeared intact during both the study and test phases; in four 
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blocks, the faces appear as offset during both the study and test phases.  To control for difficulty 
or learning effects, the order of blocks was randomized across participants.  Names were 
randomly assigned to faces. Face-name pairings were randomly assigned to blocks.  Names 
were taken from the social security websites 100 most common names of 1992. 
 Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase. During the study phase, the 6 
face-name pairings were shown in a random order for 9 seconds each.   During the test phase, 
names were shown in a random order below an array consisting of all 6 faces.   Participants were 
asked to identify the correct face from the array by indicating the number associated with the 
face.   Face arrays were created by randomly assigning each of the 6 faces a number.   
Results 
We conducted a 2 (alignment: offset, intact) X 3(group: soldiers, postal worker, criminal) 
repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each 
of the 6 group-face combinations. Results replicated the effects in Study 1.  Participants were 
more accurate at identifying intact (M= .64, SD= .17) than offset (M= .51, SD= .19) faces, 
F(1,223)=9.97, P<.001, η!!  = .27. By contrast, participants were not significantly more accurate at 
identifying face name pairings for soldiers (M= .57, SD= .12), criminals(M= .59, SD= .12) or 
United States Postal Service Employees (M= .54, SD= .12), F(2,223)=.665, P=.423.   
 The hypothesized interaction between alignment and group also emerged, 
F(2,232)=29.940, p<.001, η!!  = .32. Participants were less accurate at identifying offset faces 
paired with postal workers than offset faces paired with soldiers t(226) = 4.67 p < .001 or 
criminals t(226) = 4.6, p < .001. However, they were not more accurate at identifying intact faces 
paired with soldiers t(226) = .42, p =.21. or criminals t(226) = .11, p =.42.  The clear reduction in 
the alignment effect when faces were associated with either protectors or perpetrators of the 
social order suggests that participants were processing the faces of protectors or perpetrators 
differently from those of other human faces.  
Discussion of Study 2 
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As with the results of Study 1, the results of Study 2 supports Hypothesis 1; perceptual 
shifts occurred for both norm violators and norm upholders who are sacrificed for the greater 
good.  
 The results of Study 2 expand on Study 1 in important ways.  Using U.S. postal 
employees controls for both the effect of governmental attitudes and the effect of uniforms.  
Moreover, offsetting is a more direct manipulation of holistic processing as demonstrated by the 
facial composite task.  The composite task separating the two halves of the face and recombining 
them to create a new face must.  Individuals perceive the face, as an entirely new face, when the 
face is intact.  However, when the two halves are offset, individuals are able to recognize these 
parts as familiar.  On purely logically grounds, this suggests that offsetting provices a face-valid 
manipulation of holistic processing (McKone & Robbins, 2014).   
Study 3 
 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the perceptual dehumanization of police and army officers. 
But these results could still be due to a negative view toward authority.  Although Study 2 
attempted to control for attitudes toward government by using a group of governmental officials in 
the control condition, postal officer may not represent authority (or oppressive governmental 
regimes) to the same degree as do police and army officers.  Study 3 addresses this objection by 
assessing attitudes toward governmental authority.   
Attitudes towards police officers and convicts were assessed on several dimensions.  
The stereotype content model suggests two dimensions of traits: warmth and competence.  Fiske 
and colleagues argue that dehumanization only occurs when individuals are both low warmth and 
low competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006).  In addition to warmth 
and competence moral character is also assessed.  Goodwin, Pizza and Rozin (2013) have 
shown that moral character is more useful in predicting affiliative motivations than warmth.  
Therefore, stigmatization may be due to perceived immorality.  To control for this possibility, we 
also include a measure of moral character as well  
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Participants   
      Participants were 235 (137 Male) workers on Mechanical Turk who participated for a $5.00 
payment.  The sample was constrained to be American to reduce ambiguity in social symbols.  
The average age of participation was 37.4 (SD=12.2), lower-middle class (M=2.3 on a 5 point 
scale), and slightly liberal (M=4.6 on a 7 point scale).   
Method 
 We used the same recognition memory task as study 1 to measure perceptual 
dehumanization. Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase. During the study 
phase, the 10 face-name pairings were shown in a random order for 12.5 seconds each.   During 
the test phase, names were shown in a random order below an array consisting of all 10 faces.   
Participants were asked to identify the correct face from the array by indicating the number 
associated with the face.   Face arrays were created by randomly assigning each of the 10 faces 
a number.   
      Participants then rated their attitudes toward the police and convicts, relative to the average 
person, on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from “a lot below average” to “a lot above average. The 
16 randomized-order traits were drawn from 4 different categories: competence (organized, 
intelligent, athletic, clever), warmth (sociable, easy-going, warm, outgoing), high-character/low 
warmth (courageous, principled, honest, loyal), high-character/high warmth (kind, giving, 
cooperative, helpful).   
Results 
We conducted a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) X 3(group: police, citizen, criminal) 
repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each 
of the 6 group-face combinations. Results replicated the face inversion effect --participants were 
more accurate at identifying upright than inverted faces, F(1,232)=97.36, p<.001,η!!  = 1.02. The 
hypothesized interaction between orientation and group also emerged, F(2,232)=14.65, 
p<.001,  η!!  = .26.  
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      Importantly, the dehumanization of police officers does not appear to be driven by 
stigmatization.  On all dimensions, attitudes towards police officers appear to be positive.  Police 
officer were viewed as being of average warmth (M=3.4), 95% CI[ 3.17, 3.64] and were 
significantly above average on moral character/high warmth(M=3.9), 95% CI [3.64, 4.10], moral 
character/ low warmth (M=4.47), 95% CI[ 4.24, 4.69] and ability (M=4.45), 95% CI[4.23,4.26].  
None of these traits related were significant covariates or attenuated the effects of perceptual 
dehumanization.   
By contrast, the dehumanization of convicts appears to be driven by stigmatization.  On 
all dimensions, attitudes towards convicts appear to be negative.  Convicts were viewed as 
significantly below average on warmth (M=3.26), 95% CI[3.08, 3.45], moral character/high 
warmth(M=2.65), 95% CI[2.41, 2.90], moral character/ low warmth (M=2.37), 95% CI[2.12, 2.62] 
and ability (M=3.12), 95% CI[ 2.85, 3.39].  Importantly, moral traits were a significant covariate for 
moral (cold)  F(2,232)=7.59, p=.006 and F(2,232)=4.16, p=.042.  This reduced the significance of 
the orientation by person interaction F(2, 232) =.411, p=.63 for convicts relative to citizens.   
Discussion of Study 3 
In Study 3 we again observed perceptual shifts for both highly valued civil servants and 
norm violators.   Importantly, the pattern of results suggests that the perceptual dehumanization 
of police officers is not due to stigmatization.  Warmth, competence and moral character did not 
predict the attenuation of face processing for police officers whereas moral character attributions 
appeared to mediate perceptual effects of convicts.  One possibility raised by this pattern of 
results is that different mechanisms underlie the perceptual dehumanization of police and 
convicts.   
Study 4 
 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate the perceptual dehumanization of police and army 
officers; however, these results might still be driven by a negative view toward authority.  The 
functionalist hypothesis we advance suggests that this is due to a need to cope with the potential 
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harm, which may befall them.  In Study 4, we directly test whether the perceptual dehumanization 
of Army officers is due to the risk associated with their jobs.   
Secondly, thus far it can be argued that effects are based in recall, not recognition.  Study 
4 uses a more traditional perceptual matching task -- the Face Composite Task (FCT).  In the 
FCT two faces are split horizontally and combined.  It’s easier to identify the top half-face when 
it’s misaligned with the bottom one than when the two halves are fitted smoothly together(Young 
et al., 1987).  This is because the impression of the composite image is a novel face that does not 
resemble the original person depicted in the top or bottom portion of the image.   
If participants are processing the face holistically, they are unable to focus on just the top 
half of the face.  However, when the top and bottom half are misaligned, participants can 
recognize both the top and bottom half of the face.  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 207 (101 Male and 106 Female) students at a 
northeastern university who participated in exchange for payment.  Data was collected over a 
one-week period in the Wharton Behavioral lab. Sample size was determined by signup.  The 
average age of participation was 20.5 (stdev .9).    
 Stimuli. We again used computer generated faces of average likability and 
trustworthiness (see Todorov, Dotsch, Porter, Oosterhof, & Falvello, 2013).  Faces were 
randomly assigned to a social category was manipulated by presenting the faces from the chest 
up, dressed in either a military uniformAll faces were approximately 180 pixels wide and 250 
pixels high and were fitted onto a 256 x 256 pixel gray background.  Pairing each target top part 
with a bottom part from another individual created composite faces.  In order to ensure same and 
different trials were identical, randomly paired top and bottom parts from different individuals to 
form both the study and test stimuli.  Each of the 16 target top parts appeared approximately 
once in each condition. 
 Procedure.  Subjects performed a perceptual matching task in which they indicated 
when the top half of two faces matched.  The task is illustrated in Figure 2.2.  Prior to each trial of 
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the perceptual matching task participants, learned where the solider they were about to see was 
stationed.  The solider was stationed at either a high-risk job (e.g. Dylan Diffuses bombs in 
Hemland, Afghanistan) or a low-risk job (e.g. Dylan Coordinates supplies at Fort Still in 
Oklahoma).    
Participants then performed a perceptual recognition task.  To ensure participants 
associated the face with the soldier’s location, the name of the actor appeared below the face 
(e.g. “Dylan”).  Each trial began with the display of an the soldier’s post on screen for 2800ms.  
Following a 500ms interstimulus interval, a face appeared on screen for 400-ms.  After a 1000-ms 
interstimulus interval, the sample face appeared for 800 ms.  To avoid subjects comparing a 
specific location of the display to perform the matching task, the target and sample faces 
appeared at slightly different screen locations.  In half of the trials both the top and bottom half of 
the target and sample face were aligned.  In half of the trials both the top and bottom half of the 
target and sample face were misaligned. 
 Participants had 750 ms to decide, as fast and accurately as possible, whether these 
were the same or different.  The participants expressed their choice by pressing a left versus right 
key on a keyboard placed in front of them.  Same-aligned and same-misaligned faces appeared 
twice as target faces: once in a “same” trial, once in a “different” trial.  Target and sample faces 
always differed with regard to their bottom part.  In half of the trials, the top parts were identical 
(“same”).  In the other half, both top and bottom parts differed (“different”).  High and low risk jobs, 
as well as aligned and misaligned trials were randomly interleaved.  The experiment comprised 
64 experimental trials randomly mixed up across subjects (See figure 2.2 for a visual depiction of 
the task).  
Results 
 Results of study 4 were largely consistent with our predictions.  We conducted a 2 
(alignment: intact, offset) X 2(Post: high risk, low risk) repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) using the sensitivity index for each of the 4 act-face combinations. As shown in Figure 
2.3, participants showed greater sensitivity at recognizing intact (M=.91, SD=1.3)  than offset 
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(M=.46, SD=1.1) faces F(1,200)=135.2, p<.001, η!!= 1.14.  Participants were non-significantly 
more sensitive at identifying faces paired with high risk than with low risk post F(1,200)=2.076, 
p=.15.  However, there was a significant interaction between post and alignment, F(2, 199)=28.2, 
p<.001, η!!= .28.  When the post was high risk, participants did not show differential sensitivity to 
intact faces (M=.44, SD=1.3) than to offset faces (M=.66, SD=1.3), t(52) = .48, p =.83, d’= .17.  
When the post was low risk, participants showed greater sensitivity to offset faces (M=1.42, 
SD=1.3) than intact faces(M=.34, SD=1.1) , t(52) = 5.43, p <.001, d’= .86.  
Discussion of Study 4  
The functionalist hypothesis suggests army officers are perceptually dehumanized in 
order to cope with the potential harm—and that this result is linked to the perceived riskiness of 
these jobs.  When the risk associated with each job is manipulated, only the individuals facing risk 
are perceptually dehumanized.  Because study 4 uses a perceptual matching task the results 
therefore clearly suggest an attenuation in holistic processing.   
Importantly, Study 4 uses the Facial Composite Task.  The composite task is considered 
a gold standard for assessing holistic process because, unlike the facial inversion task, the 
composite task does not simultaneously manipulate 1st and 2nd order spatial relationships.  
Separating the two halves of the face and recombining them to create a new face must, on purely 
logically grounds, impairs holistic processing (McKone & Robbins, 2014).  For these reasons, the 
facial composite task provides the most direct evidence that the disruption of holistic processing 
is the underlying mechanism of impairment.   
An interesting aside is that this pattern of results suggests participants are misperceiving 
risk.  The dehumanization of these social groups is driven by a misperception of their risk of 
death.  The actual risk typically associated with being a police officer or solider has been less 
than 1 in 100 per year over the last 40 years.  Yet the patterns of perceptual dehumanization 
suggest that individuals judge the risk as relatively high (the perceptual dehumanization of 
soldiers with undefined levels of risk levels were similar to those in high risk jobs).  Consistently, 
	  47	  
	  
in follow up work, when we asked participants they dramatically over-estimated the risk of death 
for soldiers (it was upward of 30%).  
Study 5 
 
When applying a functionalist approach to perceptual dehumanization, it is essential to 
understand the behavioral changes produced by perceptual dehumanization.  Prior work has 
already repeatedly documented that the dehumanization of convicts facilitates punitive behavior 
(Fincher & Tetlock, 2015).  Therefore, we explore the behavioral changes that perceptual 
dehumanization induces for positive figures, specifically, military personnel.  Our theory predicts 
that the perceptual dehumanization of these laudable targets will increase indifference toward 
their well being.  We test participants’ willingness to trade soldier’s lives for the broader goals of 
combatting terrorist activity.   
Method 
Participants responded to one of three real world moral dilemmas. Each dilemma pitted 
the utilitarian goals of reducing terrorist activity and identifiable victims against each other. In the 
three dilemmas participants indicated how large a ransom they would pay to rescue a group of 
solider kidnapped by a terrorist organization, which raises money to fund al Qaeda. Although the 
soldiers would be returned upon receipt of the ransom, the money would be used to subsidize 
terrorist activity.   
Participants viewed one of the three scenarios.  The number of victims was randomly 
determined to be two or twenty.  In all cases, the face of a single identifiable victim was shown.  
The face appeared either upright or inverted.  
After reading the scenario and viewing the identified victim, responses were elicited.  
Participants were first told the range of pervious ransom which had been paid.  After reading this 
information, participants were asked “what is the maximum ransom you are willing to pay to 
rescue the hostages”.   
Results 
	  48	  
	  
We conducted a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) X 3(number of victims) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), on the log of reported ransom payments.  As shown in Figure 2.4, people 
were willing to pay significantly more for 20 soldiers (M=5,367,090, SD=4565651) than two 
soldiers (M=1,616,803.95, SD=1,935,191), F(1,595)=51.3, p<.001,η!!  = .43. . In line with our 
predictions, facial inversion reduced willingness to help.  Ransoms for inverted faces were 
significantly lower (M=2,956,036, SD=3,644,050.63) than ransoms for upright faces 
(M=3,869,492 SD=4,246,301) F(2,594)=9.24, p<.002, η!!  = .21. There was no significant 
interaction between the number of lives saved and facial orientation, F(2,594)=.67, p=.512.   
Discussion of Study 5 
 Whereas Study 4 found that the perceptual dehumanization of soldiers was linked to the 
perceived risk to their lives, Study 5 found, as predicted, that these spontaneous perceptual 
changes translated into behavioral changes.  The attenuation in face specific processing 
increased willingness to sacrifice soldiers for the greater good. 
Study 6 
 
Study 5 manipulated facial processing using the facial inversion effect. In Study 6, we use 
the technique of offsetting the top and bottom half a face to disrupt configural processing.   
Method 
Participants responded to a moral dilemmas based upon real world events. Each 
dilemma pitted the utilitarian and identifiable victim(s) against each other. All three dilemmas 
asked participants how large a ransom they would willing to pay, to rescue kidnapped victims.  
Importantly, the victims were kidnapped by a terrorist organization.  Although they would be 
returned upon receipt of the ransom, the money would be used to subsidize terrorist activity.   
Participants received one of three scenarios. In all cases, the face of a single identifiable 
victim was shown.  The face appeared either intact or offset.   After reading the scenario and 
viewing the identified victim, responses were elicited.  Participants were first told the range of 
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pervious ransoms paid for similar number of victims.  After reading this information, participants 
were asked “what is the maximum ransom you are willing to pay to rescue the hostages”.   
Results 
We conducted a 2 (display: intact, offset) analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the log of 
reported ransom payments. Inline with our predictions, results suggested facial offset reduced 
willingness to help.  Ransoms associated with offset faces were significantly lower (M=2,938,418, 
SD=3,558,202.62) than ransoms associated with intact faces(M=4,317,343.10, SD=7,284,181), 
F(2,522)=8.2, p=.004, η!!  = .20.   
Discussion of Study 6 
 The results of Study 6 conceptually replicate those of Study 5 by using a different 
manipulation of holistic processing.  The pattern of results reinforces the conclusion that an 
attenuation in face specific processing increased willingness to sacrifice soldiers for the greater 
good.  Consistent with the functionalist logic, which posits that these actors are perceptually 
dehumanized to buffer observers from the emotional pain of losing them.  
General Discussion 
 
This paper combines past theoretical accounts of dehumanization with modern work on 
perceptual categorization to explore the social function of attenuations in face typical processing.  
Studies 1-4 use a multi-method array of techniques to produce convergent evidence that the 
visual mechanisms that enable the processing of faces are inhibited in situations where 
individuals are required to suppress desire to help an identified individual.   
In Study 1 and 2 we document perceptual shifts for civil servant who are seen as 
“necessary to sacrifice” for the greater good. Study 3 builds upon this by positing that the 
dehumanization of police officers is not driven by disgust, moral condemnation or other processes 
linked to classic dehumanization. Study 4 directly tests the functionalist logic by demonstrating 
that the perceptual dehumanization of Army officers is due to the perceived riskiness of these 
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jobs.  When job risk is manipulated, only the individuals facing high risk are perceptually 
dehumanized.   
Finally, Studies 5 and 6 show that these perceptual changes translate into to behavioral 
changes.  In line with our predictions, an attenuation in face specific processing increased 
participants’ willingness to sacrifice soldiers for the greater good. We use a real life utilitarian 
dilemma world governments face, to examine if perceptual processes facilitate the devaluation of 
the lives of soldiers.   In line with our predictions, an attenuation in face specific processing 
increased participants’ willingness to sacrifice soldiers for the greater good (it reduced 
participants willingness to ransoms to terrorist organizations).  Optimistically, this research may 
suggest a strategy for certain nations to avoid paying terrorist ransom.   
These results raise the question does perceptual dehumanization function specifically to 
facilitate consequentialist thinking?  One way to test this possibility would be to examine 
perceptual dehumanization in situations, such as the trolley problem, where there are competing 
moral principles.  Because the trolley problem pits utilitarian and deontological rules against one 
another, one could establish if perceptual dehumanization facilitates participants adhesion to their 
own moral rules, or functions more specifically to support utilitarian principles.  That said, the 
victims of utilitarian action are more salient than the victims of deontological action (e.g. a single 
victim, harmed through commission, target of attention).  This would suggest that even if 
perceptual dehumanization can occur in both situations, it is more likely to be elicited by utilitarian 
thinking.    
Within psychological research, dehumanization is defined as the denial of our humanity.  
Not surprisingly, dehumanization has raised substantial psychological interest. The paradigmatic 
form of dehumanization is the Nazi who hates Jews and wants to exterminate them.  There is an 
existential conflict, the groups cannot coexist and one group must be terminated.  The 
paradigmatic form of infrahumanization is that the two groups are making clashing claims on each 
other’s resources.  Infrahumanization reduces the need take another’s perspective.   
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The third situation represented by perceptual dehumanization represents a more 
pervasive and automatic form of dehumanization.  Dehumanization is defined “the denial of 
humanness” (Haslam, 2001).  Perceptual dehumanization is the attenuation of perceptual 
processes typically evoked by human faces.  Therefore, based upon the popular definition, 
perceptual dehumanization is a form of dehumanization.  Although perceptual dehumanization is 
a less socially charged way of denying the features of personhood, it nonetheless denies one 
aspect of the typical response evoked by persons.  
One advantage of perceptual dehumanization is that it is in principle value free. Unlike 
past conceptions of dehumanization, perceptual dehumanization is not due to stigmatization or 
negative attitudes.  It might apply to those who are promoted above human status (e.g. heroes, 
gods) or demoted below human status (e.g. criminals). Defining dehumanization in a way that 
does not rely on value laden language is a sharp departure from previous work and it highlights 
the complexity of dehumanization as a psychological construct that can operate at both 
automatic, unconscious levels and at conscious, volitional levels.  As indicated in Table 2.1, 
perceptual dehumanization is a pervasive process that can be activated or deactivated by 
situational cues.  When switched on, normal reactions to harm are muted. If perceptual 
dehumanization is not elicited by stigmatization, it raises the interesting question how is this 
process turned on.   
Although visual depictions of dehumanization have existed for much of human history, 
previous work has not linked social forms of dehumanization to perceptual processing.  Our 
results highlight previously experimentally unexplored connections between social-functionalist 
theories of dehumanization and face perception.  Our data suggests that perceptual 
dehumanization supports both intra-group functions (norm enforcement/policing) and inter-group 
functions (military protection against external aggressors) that may require sacrificing valued in-
group members. The pattern of data supports the theoretical claim that the holistic processing of 
faces is attenuated by social facts in a manner that serves the formation of cooperative, non-kin 
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based communities.  This suggests that adaptations to group life may be internalized at a basic 
level of cognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Avoiding eye contact (perceptually) dehumanizes: Visual attention mediates the social 
modulation of holistic processing 
 
Faces, unlike most visual stimuli, elicit holistic processing and as a result, are one of the 
best examples of a high-level visual “module” (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000, 2002; 
Kanwisher, 2002; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006).  Modular accounts of face processing suggest that 
the holistic processing module becomes mandatorily engaged whenever presented with a face 
(e.g., Allison et al. 1995; Farah et al. 1995).  Although this has marked computational benefits 
(Giraud & Poeppel, 2012), a consequence of stimulus driven modularity is that higher-order 
factors, such as social information, should not influence perception.  
Problematically, an emerging body of social-cognitive work indicates that the attenuation 
of face processing can occur on the basis of purely social information (Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, 
Ge & Pascalis, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 
2003).  Given the strong, convergent evidence supporting some form of face processing 
modularity (see Calder, Rhodes, Johnson & Haxby, 2011 for a comprehensive review), the top-
down attenuation of face processing raises important questions about how one engages and 
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disengages perceptual modules. We examine if interactions among discrete cognitive systems 
can accounts for the influence of social processes on perceptual ones.  Specifically, we tests the 
degree to which attentional processes bring about socially induced changes in face perception.   
People perceive faces holistically or as integrated precepts (Maurer, Le Grand, 
Mondloch, 2002). This allows people to discern subtle differences in facial features and their 
spatial relations (Richler, Cheung & Gauthier, 2011).  As such, people find it is more difficult to 
ignore part of a face than part of an object (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998), people are 
better at identifying features in the context of the whole face than in isolation (Tanaka & Farah, 
1993) and recombining the top and bottom halves of faces produces the illusion of novel face 
components (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Hole, 1994; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987).   
There are two competing modular accounts that explain the marked skills associated with 
face processing.  The specific or encapsulated modularity account suggests that holistic 
processing developed to facilitate the processing of faces and that only face stimuli elicit holistic 
processing (Haxby, Gobbini, Furey, Ishai, Schouten & Pietrini, 2001; Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 
2002; Kanwisher, Downing, Epstein, & Kourtzi, 2001; Treisman,  & Kanwisher, 1998). This 
argument builds upon the premise that as a highly social species, facial recognition is particularly 
important to humans and therefore humans (and some primates) have acquired specialized 
mechanisms to recognize other’s faces (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2002).  Research from 
cognitive psychology (e.g. Bruce, Doyle, Dench & Burton 1991; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), 
computational vision (e.g. Turk & Pentland, 1991), neuropsychology (e.g. Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 1990; Behrmann, Winocur & Moscovitch, 1992), and neurophysiology (e.g. Desimone, 
1991; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, Benson & Rolls, 1992) suggests that face and object recognition 
involve qualitatively different processes that occur in distinct areas of the brain.  Consistently, 
inter-cranial recordings from macaques and human epilepsy patients, and patients with localized 
brain damage in the occipitotemporal region suggest a cortical specialization of face processing 
(Gross, Rocha-Miranda & Bender, 1972; Haxby, Grady, Horwitz, Ungerleider, Mishkin, Carson, et 
al., 1991; Desimone, 1991; Perrett et al., 1991; De Renzi, 1997).  
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The domain general or unencapsulated modularity account  (typically call the expertise 
theory) suggests that holistic processing represents a more general strategy and is evoked by 
stimuli with which individuals have perceptual expertise (Bukach, Gauthier & Tarr, 2006).    
Studies supporting this domain-general or expertise argument demonstrate that the skilled 
individuation of homogeneous non-face categories, such as birds, cars, dogs, and even novel 
object classes such as Greebles recruit putatively face-specific cognitive and neural mechanisms 
(Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski & Gore, 
1999). This suggests that holistic processing could theoretically occur across an unbounded 
number of categories if the viewer has perceptual expertise and the targets require within 
category discrimination of complex stimuli (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, & Tarr, 1997; 
Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998).   
One of the earliest problems for modular conceptions of face processing was the Other 
Race Effect (ORE).  It has long been acknowledges that people are better at discriminating and 
recognizing faces of their own race than faces of a different race (for a meta-analysis, 
see Meissner & Brigham, 2001).  More recent research documents that people are better able to 
differentiate faces based on the distinctiveness of their features and their configuration (i.e. the 
spatial relations between the features) for faces of their own race that faces of a different race 
(Michel, Corneille & Rossion, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006; Tanaka, 
Kiefer & Bukach, 2004).   
Importantly, the Other Race Effect (ORE) is not necessarily due to social modulation of 
perceptual effects.  Stimuli differ across races; therefore, one can attribute the effects of race on 
perceptual processing to a number of bottom-up explanations consistent with either form of 
modularity.  The expertise theory explains face specific processing by suggesting that people 
have different exposure to faces of different races.  Because people have more experience with 
faces of their own race, they have greater visual expertise (e.g., Rhodes, Tan, Brake, & Taylor, 
1989; Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & de Schonen, 2005).  Alternatively, the perceptual 
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narrowing accounts suggests that the determination of which stimuli are “faces” is flexible during 
infancy and therefore adults only consider same-race faces “faces” (McKone & Robbins, 2007).   
However, both forms of modularity require that “face” stimuli elicit holistic processing.  
Therefore they cannot account for recent work, which has shown that purely social information 
can attenuate the holistic processing of faces.  For example, research suggests the attenuation of 
holistic processing in both intra-group and minimal group context (Bernstein, Young & 
Hugenberg, 2007; Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Ge & Pascalis, 2007; MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 
2003).  In these paradigms, the stimulus features of the face cannot account for differences 
between groups, because faces are randomly assigned to each group or counterbalanced across 
groups.  Changes in facial processing due to group affiliation have been indexed by facial 
inversion (Bernstein, Young & Hugenberg, 2007), facial composite (Hugenberg & Corneille, 
2009), neural activity in the fusiform face area (Van Bavel, Packer& Cunningham, 2011) and the 
N170 an ERP component associated with face-processing (Ratner & Amodio, 2013).  Fincher 
and Tetlock call the attenuation of putatively face-specific processes “perceptual 
dehumanization.”  They suggest that perceptual dehumanization functions broadly as a 
mechanism for inhibiting helping behavior and argue perceptual changes facilitate social 
behavior.  
Problematically, this work has failed to acknowledge the problems social-perceptual 
effects pose for modularity.  It has similarly failed to specify alternative mechanisms through 
which perceptual dehumanization might occur.  One possibility, implied by the lack of a 
mechanism, is that social motivational processes alter perceptual directly.  This is consistent with 
the “new look”, where Bruner (1947, 1954, 1999) argued that perceptual categorization is defined 
based upon social processes.  
However this opposes traditional models of face processing.  This is incompatible with 
encapsulated modularity because encapsulated modularity suggests holistic processing is active 
by faces and faces are defined based upon their visual properties. This thesis is also incongruent 
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with the expertise hypothesis.  Although expertise suggests that stimuli other than faces can elicit 
holistic processing, because individuals have “expertise” in faces, a given face should always (or 
never) elicit holistic processing.  Given the strength of the evidence which suggests face 
processing is modular (be it encapsulated or unencapsulated), it seems unlikely the attenuation 
face processing is instantiated at the perceptual level (see Calder, Rhodes, Johnson & Haxby, 
2011 for a full summary of the evidence).   
  In this paper, we build upon a Gestalt theoretical perspective to provide an alternative 
explanation.  The Gestalt view suggests that multiple psychological processes act in tandem and 
as a result we perceive the world as an integrated precept.  This precept is not a perfect reflection 
of reality, but rather a biased perception formed in a top-down manner by many features of 
situation (Asch, 1946).  For example, work by Asch and Zukier (1984) suggests that prior 
knowledge can bias attention and alter the judgment of traits (therefore changing how a person is 
perceived).  We suggest social processes can also direct visual attentional and thereby alter face 
perception. 
Selective attention can modulate the transmission of information during the early stages 
of sensoriperceptual analysis (Moran & Desimone, 1985). Numerous studies report that selective 
attention modulates perceptual processing during the first 200 miliseconds of stimulus processing 
in a gain-control fashion (see Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998 for a review).  That is, control 
operations (e.g. selective attention and working memory), increase or decrease the transmission 
of information during the early stages of sensoriperceptual analysis within perceptual structures.  
Therefore, despite the modular nature of the FFA (i.e., its functional specificity and anatomic 
localization), face processing in this region depends on voluntary attention as indexed through 
FFA activation and N170 response (Sreenivasan  & Jha, 2007; Sreenivasan, Goldstein, Lustig, 
Rivas & Jha, 2009; Wojciulik, Kanwisher & Driver, 1998) 
Research examining the intersection of attention and perceptual processes typically 
focuses on covert attention—our ability to internally direct attention without changing our gaze.  In 
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the present work, we are interested in how social information may change the manner in which 
participants interact with their environment.  Therefore, we are interested in both overt and covert 
forms of selective attention.  A classic indicator of overt attention is visual fixation (Duncan, 1984).  
Allocating attention to a position in space results in faster and more accurate processing of 
luminance and information in a region of space surrounding that location (Bashinski & Bacharach, 
1980; Downing, 1988; Hoffman & Nelson, 1981).  Therefore, if attention alters face processing, 
gaze patterns should reflect these changes.   
Importantly, although face processing occurs relatively quickly, past work suggests that 
deviate gaze may attenuate that holistic processing of faces.  Autistic patients, who show 
impaired holistic processing, show abnormal eye fixations patterns (Pelphrey, Sasson, Reznick, 
Paul, Goldman & Piven 2002).  Furthermore, work by Blais and colleagues (2008) demonstrates 
that different patterns of fixation may underlie the emergence of other race effects in infants.  
This paper test the hypothesis that the ‘‘top–down’’ modulation of face-specific 
processing occurs through changes in attention. Five studies examine whether changes in visual 
attention drive underlie the effect of social information of face perception.  Study 1 uses eye 
tracking to test if social information leads to voluntary changes in visual attention. Study 2 tests if 
the pattern of gaze used to process unintentionally harmful actors (i.e. socially neutral actors) in 
Study 1, remove the effects of Perceptual Dehumanization.  Study 3 examines if the pattern of 
gaze used to process intentionally harmful actors (i.e. socially negative actors) in Study 1, leads 
to an attenuation in the holistic processing.  Study 4 examines if these attentional effect underlie 
the other race effect as well.  Finally, study 5 examines if visual attention towards faces, effects 
punitive behavior.   
Study 1 
 
 Past research suggests that the spatial attention system operates through visual fixations 
(Eriksen & Hoffman, 1973; Posner, 1980; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978).  Although face 
	  58	  
	  
perception occurs on a rapid time scale, even when indexed through visual fixations, spatial 
attention plays an important role. In Study 1 we index visual fixations for the processing of norm 
violator’s faces.   
Of the effects reported in the literature, norm violators show the greatest attenuation of 
holistic processing.  In order to control for negative affect or other variability across conditions we 
chose to use unintentional, but otherwise identical harms as our control condition.   Past work on 
suggests that only intentional harms are viewed as blame worthy and elicit perceptual 
dehumanization.  We predict the perpetrators of intention harm will be associated with a more 
featural pattern of visual fixations than the perpetrators of unintentional harm.   
Participants 
Sixty-Six students (23 males; age range 18-28, M=23.3, SD.=2.7) at the University of 
Pennsylvania participated in the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
All provided informed consent and were paid for their participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli.  Stimuli were thirty two white male face stimuli from the Chicago Face Database 
(Ma, Correll, Witenbrink, 2015). Images were cropped to 250 × 350 pixels and converted to 
grayscale. 
The stimulus exposures and response recording were controlled using SMI BeGaze Eye 
Gaze Software.  Eye-movements were recorded using a Tobii® 1750 eye-tracker, which has no 
interference with the user environment of the experimental participants and gives freedom of 
head movement. Participants were calibrated prior to the experiment, with its standard 10-point 
calibration procedure.   Participants were also recalibrated in-between experimental blocks.   
At a typical viewing distance of about 55 cm (head restraint was not used, since the 
Tobii® system does not require it) this corresponds to an angle of view of between 2 and 3.3 
degrees. This compares with a rated accuracy of 0.5 degrees for the Tobii® system, so a fixation 
	  59	  
	  
on the face should be securely recorded as such. The eye-tracker works at 50Hz, so returning a 
location every 20ms.  
ROIs were hand drawn based upon Gustella, Mithcells and Dadds (2008).  All features 
were defined as separate non-overlapping ROIs.  After features were defined a final ROI was 
made to encompass non-featural image space.  We defined a fixation within one of the face 
regions as being three or more consecutive hits, i.e. 60ms minimum. If the eyes left the region, 
but returned within 60ms, it was considered to be the same fixation.  Thus if the eyes moved 
away for three or more tracking samples, it was regarded as a new fixation elsewhere, but one or 
two missed samples were regarded as noise.  
Procedure  
All participants were tested individually. Participants were informed that they would be 
shown the faces of several actors and their task was to remember action committed by each 
actor, while having their eye movements recorded at the same time.  
Participants completed a recognition memory task to measure perceptual 
dehumanization.  In two blocks, faces were displayed intact, and in two blocks faces were offset.  
In each block, participants completed a learning phase and then a testing phase.  In the learning 
phase, participants learned 8 face-action pairings.  During the learning phase, actions appeared 
on scree prior to the face for 8 seconds.  Following the action, the face appeared on screen for 12 
seconds.  The task and task timing is illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
 During the test phase, all 8 faces from the learning phase of the block were displayed in 
a single arrangement that remained on screen.  Actions appeared serially below the face array, 
and the participant identified the face originally linked to the action in learning phase from the 
array.  
Display order in both the test and recall phase and face-action pairings were fully 
randomized.  Actions systematically varied in content.  All that varied was the use of the word 
intentional versus accidental in descriptions of the act.  Which actions were associated with 
intentional and unintentional harms was counterbalanced across participants.  For example, when 
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an action appeared as an intentional harm “Dylan intentionally shot his brother while hunting” 
while when the action appeared as an unintentional harm it would read, “Dylan unintentionally 
shot his brother while hunting.” 
Using a counterbalanced design, actions and faces were presented in two random 
orders.  For each face-action pairing, half of participants viewed the intentional form of the action 
and half of participants viewed the unintentional form of each action.  Order of action presentation 
was randomized during the testing phase of each action. Due to a programing error, responses in 
the memory task were not recorded.   All participants were included in the data analysis.  
Results 
Number of Fixations. We conducted a 2 (orientation: intact, offset) X 2(intention: 
intentional, unintentional) repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average 
number of fixations for each of the 4 act-face combinations.   
There was no significant difference in the frequency of fixations for intact (M=6.51, 
SD=.30) and offset (M= 6.21, SD=.30) faces F(1,62)=2.21, p=.142. Participants had a higher rate 
of fixation when the faces belongs to the actor responsible for intentional harm (M=8.35, SD=.34) 
than on the faces of actors responsible for unintentional harm (M= 4.38, SD=.26), F(1,62)=331.8, 
p<.001, η!!=.843 
Consistent with the perceptual dehumanization hypothesis, the interaction between 
alignment and intention also emerged, F(2,62)=160.21, p<.001, η!!= .721. Participants fixated 
significantly more frequently when intact faces were paired with intentional actions (M=11.05, 
SD=.55)  than with unintentional actions (M=2.58, SD=.16), t(63) = 16.17, p <.001, d’=20.91.  
Conversely, participants fixated significantly less frequently when offset faces were paired with 
intentional actions (M=5.65, SD=.21)  than unintentional actions (M=6.78, SD=.44), t(63) = 3.05, p 
=.002, d’=3.28. This suggests that when faces could evoke holistic processing participants modify 
their pattern of fixation for the faces of norm violators.   
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Distance from center. We conducted a 2 (orientation: intact, offset) X 2(intention: 
intentional, unintentional) repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average 
from the vertical center for each of the 4 act-face combinations.   
There was no significant difference in the dispersion of fixations for intact (M=32, SD=5.5) 
and offset (M= 42, SD=7.4) faces F(1,62)=2.42, p=.125. Participants showed significantly more 
disperse fixations for the faces of actors responsible for intentional harm (M=46, SD=6.7) than on 
the faces of actors responsible for unintentional harm (M= 28, SD=5.8), F(1,62)=10.86, P=.001, η!!=.149 
Consistent with the perceptual dehumanization hypothesis, an interaction between 
alignment and intention also emerged, F(2,62)=5.66, p=.02, η!!= .084. Participants showed 
significantly more dispersion in their fixations when intact faces were paired with intentional 
actions (M=55, SD=7.4) than with unintentional actions (M=28, SD=5.1), t(63) = 4.05, p <.001, 
d’=4.25.  Dispersion did not differ when offset faces were paired with intentional actions (M=28, 
SD=8.5) or unintentional actions (M=36, SD=7.9), t(63) = .67, p =.25. Again, this suggests that 
when faces could evoke holistic processing participants modify their pattern of fixation for the 
faces of norm violators.   
Location of fixation. As shown in Figure 3.2.Panel A, we manually drew ROI of the 
forehead, cheeks, eyes, lips, nose, chin, hairline and blank space on each of the face display.  
We then computed the average number of fixations in each ROI for each face.  Figure 3.2 
illustrates the fixation frequency for each ROI by condition.    
Based on prior work, we were particularly interested in the frequency of fixations on the 
eyes.  We conducted a 2 (orientation: intact, offset) X 2(intention: intentional, unintentional) 
repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the percentage fixations on the eye region 
for each 4 act-face combinations.   
There was no significant difference between the percentage of fixations on the eyes for 
intact (M=42%, SD=2%) and offset (M= 39%, SD=2%) faces, F(1,62)=2.86, p=.096. However, 
participants fixated significantly less on the eyes of actors responsible for intentional harm 
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(M=35%, SD=2%) than on the eyes of actors responsible for unintentional harm (M= 45%, 
SD=2%), F(1,62)=18.93, p<.001, η!!=.234. 
Consistent with the perceptual dehumanization hypothesis, the interaction between 
alignment and intention also emerged, F(2,62)= 16.85, p<.001, η!!= .214. Participants fixated 
significantly less on the eyes when intact faces were paired with intentional actions (M=33%, 
SD=3%)  than with unintentional actions (M=51%, SD=3%), t(63) = 4.29, p <.001, d’=6.0.  
However, participants did not fixated significantly less on the eyes when offset faces were paired 
with intentional actions (M=38%, SD=2%) or unintentional actions (M=39%, SD=2%), t(63) = .67, 
p =.45. This suggests that only when faces could evoke holistic processing did participants avoid 
fixating on the eye region of the face of norm violators.   
Discussion of Study 1 
The pattern of gaze in study 1 suggests that when the faces of perpetrators of intentional 
harm had the capacity to evoke holistic processing, participants modified their pattern of visual 
attention.  The intact faces of perpetrators were associated with a greater number of fixations 
over a greater region of the face.  This pattern of visual attention is more consistent with featural 
processing than holistic processing (Eisen, 2007).    
Furthermore, it seems participants are avoiding the eye region of the face.  Many face-
perception studies have shown that the eyes are critical in perceiving upright faces.  The eyes are 
highly diagnostic for identity and expression judgments (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001), and essential for monitoring ongoing social communications(Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002).  Therefore, avoiding “eye-contact” may a useful strategy for social 
disengagement. 
Study 2 
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Study 1 demonstrates that participants attend to the faces of intentionally harmful actors 
differently than they typically attend to the faces of unintentionally harmful actors.  In Study 2, we 
link changes in visual attention to changes in face processing.  
Exogenous orienting is a reflexive saccade or an automatic response to a sudden 
change.  In Study 2, we used this reflex to exogenously manipulated attentional focus and force 
individuals to focus on a face randomly assigned to belong to intentionally or unintentionally 
harmful actors, using a gaze pattern associated with the perpetrator of an unintentional harm.  
We predict this gaze pattern will produce holisitic process regardless of the socially information 
with which the face is paired. 
Participants 
Participants were 48 (28 Male and 20 Female) students at a northeastern university who 
participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Data was collected over a two-week 
period.  Sample size was determined by the number of students who volunteered to participate in 
the 12 days between the study posting and the end of the term.  The average age of participation 
was 20.4 (stdev .9) and liberal (mean 5.2 on a 7 point scale).   
Stimuli 
Stimuli were thirty-two white male face stimuli from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, 
Correll, Witenbrink, 2015).  Images were made into a graphic interchange formatted image (GIF), 
in which the appearance of multiple fixation-crosses manipulated visual fixation.   
Method 
We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization. For every 
participant, the experiment consisted of four blocks, each consisting of eight face–action 
associations. In two blocks, faces appeared intact during both the study and test phases; in two 
blocks, the faces appeared as offset during both the study and test phases.   To control for 
difficulty or learning effects, the order of blocks was randomized across participants.  Faces and 
actions were randomly assigned to one of four blocks. Within each block, we randomized the 
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face–action pairings across participants to avoid spurious performance effects for particular face–
action combination.   
Importantly, we manipulated the participants’ visual fixation.  Half of participants observed 
unaltered faces, which allowed them to fixate freely.  Half of participants viewed faces where 
exogenous cues force them to visually fixate on the face as though it belonged to the perpetrator 
of an unintentional harm.  For each face, we computed average pattern of fixation for that 
particular face, in Study 1 when it was assigned to belong to the perpetrator of an unintentional 
harm.   
 We computed the “average gaze pattern” by calculating the average duration of each 
fixation (until the sum of durations was greater than 8 seconds) for that face when it was 
associated with an unintentional harm in study 1.  For each fixation, we then computed the 
average deviation in gaze from the center of the face as an absolute vector.  We then used the 
most common direction of deviation to determine the direction of the vector. We therefore had an 
average time of onset and average location for each fixation for each face of an unintentionally 
harmful actor in study 1.  An example of the calculated fixation locations is shown in Panel A of 
Figure 3.3.     
In order to force participants to adapt this pattern of this pattern of gaze used by 
participants in Study 1, a fixation cross flashed on screen for 100ms in the “average” locations at 
the average time of onset associated with each fixation. To avoid uncued saccades, if the fixation 
length was greater than 2 seconds, the fixation-cross flashed in place every 2 seconds.  
Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase.  In the study phase, participants 
learned eight face-action pairings.  Participants viewed an action on screen for 5 seconds before 
the presentation of the face of actor (either intact or offset) for 8 seconds.  During the test phase, 
participants viewed actions in a random order below an array consisting of all eight faces.  
Participants were asked to identify the correct face from the array by indicating the number 
associated with face.  Face arrays were created by randomly assigning each of the eight faces a 
number.   
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Actions appeared serially below the face array, and the participant identified the face 
originally linked to the action in learning phase from the array. The task used the same intentional 
and unintentional actions as Study 1.   
After completing the memory task, participants were asked their gender, age and political 
beliefs.  We report all measures and conditions here.    
Results 
All participants were included in the data analysis.  We conducted a 2 (alignment: intact, 
offset) X 2(intention: intentional, unintentional) X 2(fixation: controlled, uncontrolled) repeated 
measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each of the 4 
act-face combinations.  As illustrated in Figure 3.4 Panel A, results replicated the alignment effect 
--participants were more accurate at identifying faces-pairings, when pairing used intact (M=.594, 
SD=.026) than offset (M=.465, SD=.027)faces F(1,112)=22.98, p<.001, η!!  = .169.  
Consistent with the perceptual dehumanization hypothesis, an interaction between 
alignment and intention emerged, F(2,112)=14.51, p<.001, η!!= .114. Participants were marginally 
more accurate at identifying offset faces paired with intentional actions (M=.51, SD=.03)  than 
offset faces paired with unintentional actions (M=.43, SD=.03), t(114) = 2.70, p =.003, d’= 2.69.  
Conversely participants more were more accurate at identifying intact faces paired with 
unintentional actions (M=.63, SD=.03)  than intact faces paired with intentional actions (M=.55, 
SD=.03), t(92) = 2.78, p =.003, d’= 2.67. Therefore, there was clear reduction in the alignment 
effect for faces linked to intentional harms.   
Consistent with the notion that face typical processing is associated with a particular 
pattern of gaze, an interaction emerged between alignment and fixation, F(2,90)=6.61, p=.011, η!!= .055. Participants were more accurate at identifying intact (M=.56, SD=.04)  than offset faces 
(M=.37, SD=.04) when fixation was controlled, t(50) = 5.24, p <.001, d’= 6.34.  However, 
participants were only marginally more accurate at identifying intact faces (M=.63, SD=.03)  than 
offset faces(M=.57, SD=.04) when allowed to fixate freely, t(63) = 1.79, p =.04, d’= 2.00.  
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Finally, consistent with predications, a significant interaction emerged between alignment, 
fixation and the intention of the action, F(3,112)=8.31, p=.005, η!!= .068. When actions were 
intentional, manipulating fixation interfered with processing.  When participants were forced to 
fixate on the faces of intentional perpetrators of harm as though they belonged to unintentionally 
harmful actors, participants were more accurate at identifying intact (M=.56, SD=.04)  than offset 
faces (M=.38, SD=.04), t(50) = 3.21, p <.001, d’= 6.00.  However, when participants were allowed 
to fixate freely, participants were more accurate at identifying offset faces (M=.62, SD=.04)  than 
intact faces(M=.54, SD=.04), t(63) = 1.70, p =.05, d’= 2.67 for intentional perpetrators of harm.  
On the other hand, when actions were unintentional, fixation did not have an effect on 
processing.  Participants were significantly more accurate at identifying intact (M=.56, SD=.03)  
than offset faces (M=.39, SD=.02) when fixation did not interfere with processing, t(50) = 3.73, p 
<.001, d’= 5.67.  Participants remained more accurate at identifying intact faces (M=.71, SD=.03)  
than offset faces(M=.51, SD=.03) when fixation interfered with processing, t(63) = 3.8, p <.001, 
d’= 6.67.  
Discussion of Study 2 
 Results of Study 2 suggest that patterns of visual fixation may drive perceptual 
dehumanization.  When exogenous cuing lead participants to fixate on the face of an intentionally 
harmful actor in a manner typically used to fixation on unintentionally harmful actor, participants 
no longer show a reduction in face-typical processing for the faces of intentionally harmful actors.  
This suggests that the atypical patterns of fixation observed in Study 1 likely drive perceptual 
dehumanization effects.   
Study 3 
 
Study 2 demonstrates that forcing participants to fixate on the faces as intentionally 
harmful actors, in a manner typically used when observing unintentionally harmful actors, 
removes the effects of perceptual dehumanization.  However, if fixation is driving the attenuation 
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in face processing, the opposite effect should occur as well.  Study 3 tests if forcing to fixate on 
the faces of unintentionally harmful actors in manners typically used to observe perpetrators of 
intentional harm, leads to an attenuation of face-specific processing in faces typically processed 
holistically. 
Participants 
Participants were 92 (60 Male and 32 Female) participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk Masters.  The average age of participation was 35.0 (SD=10.8) and liberal (M=4.5 on a 7 
point scale).   
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were thirty two white male face stimuli and eighteen black male face stimuli from 
the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, Witenbrink, 2015). Images were made into GIFs, in 
which the appearance of multiple fixation-crosses manipulated visual fixation.   
Method 
We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization. For every 
participant, the experiment consisted of four blocks, each consisting of eight face–action 
associations. In two blocks, faces appeared intact during both the study and test phases; in two 
blocks, the faces appeared as offset during both the study and test phases.  To control for 
difficulty or learning effects, we randomized the order of blocks across participants.  We randomly 
assigned faces and actions to one of four blocks. Within each block, we randomized the face–
action pairings across participants to avoid spurious performance effects for particular face–
action combination.   
Importantly, we manipulated the participants visual fixation.  Half of participants observed 
unaltered faces with no visual fixation.  Half of participants viewed gifs of faces, which used 
variable fixations to force them to visually fixate on the face in a manner typical of intentionally 
harmful actors in Study 1.  For each face, we computed average pattern of fixation for that 
particular face, in Study 1 when it was assigned to belong to the perpetrator of an intentional 
harm.   
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 We computed the “average gaze pattern” by calculating the average duration of each 
fixation (until the sum of durations was greater than 8 seconds) for that face when it was 
associated with an intentional harm in study 1.  For each fixation, we then computed the average 
deviation in gaze from the center of the face as an absolute vector.  We then used the most 
common direction of deviation to determine the direction of the vector. We therefore had an 
average time of onset and average location for each fixation for each face of an intentionally 
harmful actor in study 1.  An example of the calculated fixation locations is shown in Panel B of 
Figure 3.3.     
In order to force participants to adapt this pattern of this pattern of gaze used by 
participants in Study 1, a fixation-cross flashed on screen for 100ms in the “average” locations at 
the average time of onset associated with each fixation. To avoid uncued saccades, if the fixation 
length was greater than 2 seconds, the fixation-cross flashed in place every 2 seconds.  
Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase.  In the study phase, participants 
learned eight face-action pairings.  Participants viewed an action on screen for 5 seconds before 
the presentation of the face of actor (either intact or offset) for 8 seconds.  During the test phase, 
actions were shown in a random order below an array consisting of all eight faces.   Participants 
were asked to identify the correct face from the array by indicating the number associated with 
face.  Face arrays were created by randomly assigning each of the eight faces a number.   
After completing the memory task, participants were asked their gender, age and political 
beliefs.  We report all measures and conditions here.   
Results 
All participants were included in the data analysis.  We conducted a 2 (alignment: intact, 
offset) X 2(intention: intentional, unintentional)X 2(fixation: controlled, uncontrolled) repeated 
measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each of the 4 
act-face combinations.  As illustrated in Figure 3.4 Panel B, Participants were more accurate at 
identifying faces-pairings, when pairing used intact (M=.62, SD=.33) than offset (M=.56, 
SD=.32)faces F(1,90)=6.12, p=.015, η!!= .064.  
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Consistent with the perceptual dehumanization hypothesis, an interaction between 
alignment and intention emerged, F(2,90)=7.70, p=.007, η!!= .08. Participants were marginally 
more accurate at identifying offset faces paired with intentional actions (M=.58, SD=.03)  than 
offset faces paired with unintentional actions (M=.55, SD=.03), t(92) = .40, p =.35.  Conversely 
participants more were more accurate at identifying intact faces paired with unintentional actions 
(M=.66, SD=.03)  than intact faces paired with intentional actions (M=.59, SD=.03), t(92) = 2.74, p 
=.003, d’= 2.33. Therefore, there was clear reduction in the inversion effect for faces linked to 
negative actions.   
Consistent with the notion that face typical processing is associated with a particular 
pattern of gaze, an interaction emerged between alignment and fixation, F(2,90)=17.52, p<.001, η!!= .16. Participants were more accurate at identifying intact (M=.63, SD=.03)  than offset faces 
(M=.49, SD=.02) when fixation did not interfere with processing, t(46) = 1.90, p =.03, d’= 4.67.  
Conversely, participants were more accurate at identifying offset faces (M=.64, SD=.03)  than 
intact faces(M=.60, SD=.03) when fixation interfered with processing, t(46) = 1.89, p =.03, d’= 
1.33.  
Finally, consistent with predications, a significant interaction emerged between alignment, 
fixation and the intention of the action, F(3,90)=9.86, p=.002, η!!  = .10. When actions were 
unintentional, manipulating fixation interfered with processing.  Participants were more accurate 
at identifying intact (M=.63, SD=.03)  than offset faces (M=.49, SD=.02) when fixation did not 
interfere with processing, t(46) = 2.35, p =.01, d’= 4.67.  Conversely, participants were more 
accurate at identifying offset faces (M=.64, SD=.03)  than intact faces(M=.60, SD=.03) when 
fixation interfered with processing, t(46) = 1.77, p =.03, d’= 1.33. Therefore, there was clear 
reduction in the inversion effect for faces linked to negative actions.   
On the other hand, when actions were intentional, fixation did not have an effect on 
processing.  Participants were not significantly more accurate at identifying intact (M=.60, 
SD=.03)  than offset faces (M=.55, SD=.02) when fixation did not interfere with processing, t(46) 
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= .56, p =.16.  Participants were no more accurate at identifying offset faces (M=.57, SD=.03)  
than intact faces(M=.63, SD=.03) when fixation interfered with processing, t(46) = .35, p =.40.  
Discussion of Study 3 
The results of Study 3 suggest that patterns of visual fixation may drive perceptual 
dehumanization effects.  When fixation was controlled, and participants used the fixation patterns 
adopted towards intentionally harmful actors in study 1, participants showed an attenuation of 
face typical processing for both intentionally harmful actors and unintentionally harmful actors.  
This suggests, fixation patterns in Study 1 changed the way participants were processing the 
faces of harmful actors.  As clearly illustred in Figure 3.4 the manipulations in Studies 2 and 3 
produced the opposite effect on perception.  While the fixation pattern used in Study 2, increased 
holistic processing, the fixation pattern used in Study 2 removed holistic processing.  Therefore, 
the results of study 2 and 3 in conjunction rule out a number of simple alternative explanations 
(e.g. the exogenous cue distracts participants).  
Study 4 
 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that manipulating visual attention drive the changes in 
visual processing associated with norm violators.  Study 4 examines if changes in fixation can 
attenuate the Other Race Effect.  
Participants 
Participants were 215 (90 Male and 125 Female) Caucasian participants from the 
Wharton Behavior lab.  258 Participants were recruited, non-white participants were omitted. The 
average age of participation was 21.6 (SD=10.7) and liberal (M= 4.5 on a 7 point scale).  It should 
be noted that the Study used a student sample to examine race.  The student sample was drawn 
from a privileged, predominately white university.  While, this is not uncommon in psychological 
research an atypically of the sample is that the university is located in a predominately African-
American, relatively disadvantaged area of a city.  As a consequence, race appears highly (and 
visibly) related to economic (e.g. poverty) and social problems (e.g. shootings, teenage 
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pregnancy) in student’s immediate environment and corresponds highly with social groupings 
(university students vs west Philadelphians).  To the degree that racial attitudes are based in 
Bayesian computations these environmental factors may alter race effects in our study.   
Method 
 Stimuli.  Stimuli were eighteen white male face stimuli and eighteen black male face 
stimuli from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, Witenbrink, 2015). Images were made into 
GIFs, in which the appearance of multiple fixation-crosses manipulated visual fixation.   
Procedure.  We used a recognition memory task to measure perceptual dehumanization.   
Participants were asked to remember face name pairings for African-American and Caucasian 
faces.   
Importantly, we manipulated visual fixation across participants. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Participants fixated: free, featurally or centrally.  In 
the free fixation condition participants viewed unaltered faces. Participants attention was not 
manipulated and participants could fixate freely.  In the feautral fixation condition participants 
viewed faces  which were manipulated in order to force them to visually fixate on multiple features 
of the face.  In these faces, a flashing-cross appears on different facial features.  The cross 
appeared on the nose, the mouth, the chin, the forehead and the eyes in a randomly determined 
order.  The fixation-cross appeared every 1900 milliseconds for 100 milliseconds for the entire 
display of the face. 
 In the central fixation condition, participants viewed faces, which were manipulated in 
order to force them to visually fixate on the center of the face.  In these faces, the faces displayed 
had a flashing-cross centered in the vertical and horizontal mid point of the eye region.   The 
fixation-cross appeared every 1000 milliseconds for 200 milliseconds for the entire display of the 
face. 
The experiment used a fully crossed design.  For every participant, the experiment 
consisted of four blocks, each consisting of six face–name associations. In two blocks, faces 
appeared upright during both the study and test phases; in two blocks, the faces appeared as 
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inverted during both the study and test phases.   Faces and names were randomly assigned to 
one of four blocks.  African-American and Caucasian faces were interleaved within each block.  
Within each block, we randomized the face–action pairings across participants to avoid spurious 
performance effects for particular face–action combination.  To control for difficulty or learning 
effects, we randomized the order of blocks across participants.  
Each block consisted of a study phase and a test phase.  In the study phase, participants 
learned six face-name pairings.  Participants viewed a single face (either upright or inverted) and 
the actors name on a screen for 10 seconds.  We randomly selected names for Caucasian faces 
from the 50 most common Male Caucasian names in 1991 (the average age of the photo target).  
We randomly selected names for African-American faces form 50 most common Male African-
American names in 1991 (the average age of the photo target).   
During the test phase, participants viewed actions in a random order below an array 
consisting of all six faces.  Participants were asked to identify the correct face from the array by 
indicating the number associated with face.  Face arrays were created by randomly assigning 
each of the six faces a number.  After completing the memory task, participants were asked their 
gender, age and political beliefs.  We report all measures and conditions here.   
Results 
All participants were included in the data analysis.  We conducted a 2 (orientation: 
upright, inverted) X 2(race: white, black)X 2(fixation: free, central, featural) repeated measure 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average response accuracy for each of the 4 act-face 
combinations.   
Results replicated the face inversion effect --participants were more accurate at 
identifying faces-pairings, when pairing used upright (M=.62, SD=.03) than inverted (M=.56, 
SD=.02)faces F(1,212)=68.48, p<.001, η!!  = .244. Similarly consistent with past results, 
participants were more accurate at identifying same-race faces (Caucasian) (M=.61, SD=.03 ) 
than other race faces (African-American) (M=.57, SD=.03), F(1,212)=65.7, p<.001, η!!= .237. 
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The interaction between orientation and race was marginal, F(2,212)=2.60, P=.10, η!!= 
.012. This reduction in the Other Race Effect, was due to visual attenuation.  A three way 
interaction between race, orientation and visual fixation emerged, F(2,90)=17.52, p<.001, η!!= 
.16.  
Participants were more accurate at identifying upright (M=.63, SD=.03)  than inverted 
faces (M=.49, SD=.02) when fixation did not interfere with processing, t(46) = 1.90, p =.03, d’= 
5.49.  Conversely, participants were more accurate at identifying inverted faces (M=.64, SD=.03)  
than upright faces(M=.60, SD=.03) when fixation interfered with processing, t(46) = 1.89, p =.03, 
d’= 1.33. Therefore, there was clear reduction in the inversion effect for faces linked to negative 
actions.   
Finally, consistent with predications, a significant interaction emerged between 
orientation, fixation and the intention of the action, F(3,90)=7.23, p=.001, η!!  = .064.  
When fixation was not manipulated, results replicated past work on the other race effect.  
Participants were more accurate at identifying faces-pairings, when pairing used upright (M=.48, 
SD=.03) than inverted (M=.36, SD=.02)faces F(1,69)=26.75, p<.001, η!!= .279. Similarly 
consistent with past results, participants were more accurate at identifying same-race faces 
(Caucasian) (M=.48, SD=.03 ) than other race faces (African-American) (M=.36, SD=.03), 
F(1,69)=24.32, p<.001, η!!= .261.  Importantly, a significant interaction between orientation and 
emerged, F(2, 69)=20.17, p<.001, η!!= . 226.  Participants were more accurate at identifying 
upright (M=.58, SD=.03)  than inverted faces (M=.36, SD=.02) for Caucasian faces, t(46) = 6.45, 
p <.001, d’= 7.33.  However, participants were not significantly more accurate at upright (M=.39, 
SD=.04)  than inverted faces(M=.36, SD=.04) when the faces belonged to African-American 
targets, t(46) = 0.289, p =.386. Therefore, there was clear reduction in the inversion effect for 
African-American actors.   
When fixation was manipulated such that participants fixated centrally, the Other Race 
effect was attenuated.   Participants were more accurate at identifying faces-pairings, when 
pairing used upright (M=.51, SD=.03) than inverted (M=.40, SD=.02)faces F(1,71)=33.73, p<.001, 
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η!!= .322. Similarly consistent with past results suggesting heighted attention to same-raced 
faces, participants were more accurate at identifying same-race faces (Caucasian) (M=.52, 
SD=.03 ) than other race faces (African-American) (M=.42, SD=.03), F(1,71)=19.48, p<.001, η!!= 
.215.  However, when participants fixation was manipulated, so that it was the same across 
conditions, the interaction between race and inversion was attenuated, F(2, 71)=.036, p=.85.  
Both Caucasian and African American faces showed the facial inversion effect.  Participants were 
more accurate at identifying upright (M=.60, SD=.03)  than inverted faces (M=.45, SD=.02) 
Caucasian faces, t(70) = 3.38, p <.001, d’= 5.89.  Similarly, participants were more accurate at 
upright (M=.47, SD=.04)  than inverted faces(M=.34, SD=.04) when the African-American targets, 
t(70) = 3.85, p <.001, d’= 3.25.  
As when fixation was manipulated such that participants fixated centrally, when fixation 
was manipulated through featural processing, the Other Race effect was attenuated.   Consistent 
with past results suggesting heighted attention to same-raced faces, participants were more 
accurate at identifying same-race faces (Caucasian) (M=.52, SD=.03 ) than other race faces 
(African-American) (M=.42, SD=.03), F(1,72)=23.64, p<.001, η!!  = .247.  In spite, of the 
processing manipulation, participants were more accurate at identifying faces-pairings, when 
pairing used upright (M=.51, SD=.03) than inverted (M=.40, SD=.02)faces F(1,72)=11.37, p<.001, η!!  = .136. Again, when participants fixation was manipulated, the interaction between race and 
inversion was attenuated, F(2, 71)=1.169, p=.283.  
Study 4 Discussion 
The results of Study 4 suggest that patterns of visual fixation may underlie the Other 
Race effect (at least in certain context).  When participants attend to faces freely, the results 
replicated the other race effect. When exogenous orienting forced participants to attend centrally, 
participants showed face typical processing for both Caucasians and African-Americans.  
However, when orienting lead participants to attend to features of the face, participants showed 
an attenuation of face typical processing for both Caucasians and African-Americans.   
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Although, it is not surprising that featural fixations lead to an attenuate of holistic 
processing, it is notable that central fixations could produce the holistic processing of other race 
faces.  If the other race effect is due to a failure to encode other race faces as faces, 
manipulations of attention should not induce holistic processing.  This result suggests that social 
features of other races underlie the effect.   
When interpreting our results, the location of student sample is worth noting.  Participants 
in our sample have a high degree of exposure to African-American faces, the population of West 
Philadelphia is 76% African American (interestingly, the majority of Caucasians are affiliated with 
the University).  Therefore although our pattern of results was inconsistent the ORE resulting from 
a lack of expertise, the ORE may be due to expertise under some conditions.   
Study 5 
 
      Results from Studies 1 to 4 suggest that social information leads to changes in visual fixation, 
which alters the visual processing of faces.  Study 5 directly links visual fixation to a change in the 
social behavior adapted towards these targets.   
Specifically, Study 5 tests the impact of the manipulations of visual fixation on punitive decisions.   
Participants 
Participants were 144 (84 Male and 60 Female) Caucasian American Masters workers on 
Mechanical Turk who participated for $1.00 payment.  We collected data from 200 participants, 
however, non-Caucasian participants were excluded from analysis.   
 Stimuli.  Stimuli were ten white male face stimuli and ten black male face stimuli from the 
Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, Witenbrink, 2015).  Images were made into a graphic 
interchange formatted image (GIF), in which the appearance of multiple fixation cross 
manipulated visual fixation.   
Procedure.  Participants rated the appropriate punishment for 20 individuals (10 white 
faces, 10 black faces) on a unique 13-point scale adopted from the justice-research 
literature(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; John M Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2001).  
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The scale ranged from “No sentence” to “Death sentence” with non-linear intervals given in 
weeks, months, and years of incarceration. Actions were randomly assigned to faces for each 
participant.   
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Participant’s visual 
fixation, while viewing the faces was manipulated.  Participants could fixate: free, centrally or 
featurally.   The stimulus properties were identical to those in Study 4. 
Results.  We conducted a 2 (Race: Caucasian, African-American) X (Fixation: free, 
central, featural) mixed model ANOVA on punitiveness.  As shown in Figure 3.5, there was a 
significant effect of race on punitiveness, consistent with past research participants assigned 
significantly harsher punishments to African-American (M=8.2, SD=1.3) than Caucasian (M=7.8, 
SD=1.2) faces, F(1,133)=4.29, p=.044, η!!  = .03.   
In line with our predictions, visual fixation significantly influenced punitive drives, 
F(1,133)=14.27, p<.001, η!!  = .177.      Participants were significantly more punitive when fixating 
featurally (M=8.9, SD=1.3) than when allowed to fixate freely(M=8.3, SD=1.4) , t(46) = 3.22, p 
=.002, d’= .44.  On the other hand participants were significantly less punitive when fixating 
centrally(M=7.9, SD=1.4) than when allowed to fixate freely(M=8.3, SD=1.4) , t(45) = 5.10, p 
<.001, d’= .29.   
Finally, manipulating visual fixation, altered punitive behavior differently for individuals of 
different races.  There was a significant interaction between race and visual fixation, 
F(3,133)=4.18, p=.02, η!!  = .059.  When participants fixated freely, they were significantly more 
punitive than African-Americans (M=8.8, SD=1.1) than Caucasians(M=8.0, SD=1.1) , t(50) = 3.6, 
p <.001, d’= .73.  When participants fixated centrally, they were not significantly more punitive 
than African-Americans (M=7.9, SD=1.1) than Caucasians(M=7.8, SD=1.2) , t(45) = .22, p=.82.  
Similarly, when participants fixated centrally, they were not significantly more punitive than 
African-Americans (M=8.9, SD=1.1) than Caucasians(M=8.8, SD=1.1) , t(51) = .14, p=.88.   
Discussion of Study 5 
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Study 5 directly links patterns of visual fixation to willingness to punish.  In line with our 
predictions, when exogenous cuing leads participants to fixate centrally, they become less 
punitive.  When exogenous cuing leads participants to fixate featurally, they become more 
punitive.  
 Interestingly, there was an interaction of race with visual fixation.  Although when visual 
fixation was controlled, individuals punished African-American and Caucasian actors equally, 
when participants fixated freely, individuals punished African American actors significantly more 
harshly than Caucasian actors (for identical actions).  Importantly, this result suggests that minor 
behavioral changes such as increased eye contact can control at least part of the punitive 
differential observed in society.   
General Discussion 
 
Work on both the Other Race Effect and Perceptual Dehumanization documents the 
attenuation of face specific processing, however, neither line of work captures the mechanism 
that enables the selective engagement of face processing.  The present work suggests that social 
processes shape perceptual processes through attention.   
 Study 1 uses eye tracking to examine changes in visual attention and suggests that 
directing attention away from the center of the face, specifically the eyes, attenuates face specific 
processing.  Studies 2 and 3 suggest that when fixation was controlled, perceptual 
dehumanization (the attenuation of punatively face-specific) is attenuated. This pattern of results, 
suggests that the atypical patterns of fixation observed in Study 1 are likely driving perceptual 
dehumanization effects.   
It is worth noting that in our dataset, it appears that visual fixation may drive the Other 
Race effect as well.   Controlled central fixation on other race faces was able to induce the holistic 
processing of these faces.  Neither perceptual narrowing nor expertise can account would predict 
that manipulating fixation could induce the holistic processing.  This result suggests that visual 
attention and the social features of other races may underlie the well-established effect. Study 5 
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suggests that it is the changes in visual fixation, which enable perceptual processes to effect 
social behavior.   
The eye-tracking results were extremely robust.  Indeed, the highly deviated gaze would 
be overtly visible in a social interaction, as would the notable reduction in eye contact.  It is 
important to realize that while this type of interaction would likely be acceptable when engaging 
with criminals in most social groups (barring Quakers, Norwegians and restorative justice 
advocates), these dynamics would not apply to race relations in many parts of the world, foremost 
among which are educated Northeast liberal Americans (the demographic from which our sample 
is drawn).  To the degree that attentional mechanisms underlie the other race effect, given the 
complex social dynamics surrounding race relations, one would predict attention would be 
misdirected covertly.  Consequently, one would  likely need to develop clever paradigms for 
assessing covert attention to test if different attentional strategies underlie the ORE.    
Stated in its simplest form, these results suggest that people avoid eye contact with 
individuals whom they perceptually dehumanize. This simplified form of the argument relates to 
the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). Allport's theory states that under appropriate conditions 
interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and 
minority group members.  Allport's proposal was that properly managed contact between the 
groups should reduce these problems and lead to better interactions. In line with Allport’s 
suggestion, our work suggests that changes in visual attention, leads to changes the perceptual 
categorization and subsequent treatment of  “others.”  This line of work enriches this central 
social psychological theory through providing a detailed mechanistic account of the processes 
which make eye contact an effective vehicle of humanization.  It connections across levels of 
analyses, between the more macro social phenomena and the micro mechanisms of face 
perception through bridging neuro-cognitive work on facial and object perception with social 
psychological work on contact and stigmatization.   
There is an interesting question of how aware individuals are of the perceptual changes.  
The choice of where to send the eye next is not random but instead appears to be guided 
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(Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989). Yarbus (1967), for example, pointed out that the pattern of eye 
fixations that a given observer produces is influenced by properties of the scene as well as the 
goals and interests of the perceiver. This suggests that atypical processing occurs with some 
awareness; however, changes in perceptual processing likely function outside the conscious 
domain.  Perceptual dehumanization therefore raises interesting questions about control and 
automaticity. 
Research on priming and automaticity in social psychology suggests that the mere, 
passive perception of environmental events directly triggers higher mental processes in the 
absence of any involvement by conscious, intentional processes (see reviews in Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000; Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Chartrand, 2007; Higgins, 1996).  Our model of perceptual 
dehumanization provides an alterative route through which implicit processes can shape 
behavior.  It suggests an ongoing interplay between conscious and unconscious processes.  As 
suggested by table 3.1, high-order slower cognitive processes may have the ability to shape 
quicker more basic processes.  This movement between higher order and basic processes (which 
occur more rapid than cognition) may result in an interesting blurring of conscious and 
unconscious processes.   
While individuals may not be aware of the mechanisms through which they adopt harsher 
attitudes towards the targets of perceptual dehumanization, it appears to occur due to a strategic 
attentional deployment. Insofar as attention is controllable, unfair treatment due to perceptual 
dehumanization may be easy to attenuate.  However, insofar as redirecting attention produces 
dissonance and discomfort, the changes may be difficult to reinstate without high degrees of self-
awareness. 
The interplay between these processes raises questions about cognitive organization.  
The current results suggest that higher-level processes may be captured through interactions 
among lower level system, rather than mandating unique architecture.  More specifically, “central” 
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and flexible systems (e.g. attention) may control the expression of lower level processes (e.g. 
perception) so that they act to create a system that serves social goals.  
This organizational structure is somewhat incongruous with classical notions of 
modularity.  Definitionally, modules (particularly as the term is used within perception) will have 
specific input criteria and only information of certain types or formats will be processable by a 
specialized system.  As a result, the modularity arguments are largely theoretically uninformative.  
The attentional modulation of perceptual processes is clearly inconsistent with strictly modular 
perspective such as the one advocated by Sperber (1994) and to a lesser degree the 
unencapsulated cognitive mechanisms as Fodor (1983) suggested.  
On the other hand, this structural organization is largely consistent with ideas put forth by 
Gestalt psychologist.  The central principle of Gestalt psychology is that the mind forms a global 
whole with self-organizing tendencies.  Gestalt principles stressed interactions among fields of 
psychological force; Just as the arrangement of electrostatic forces in an electrical field, the 
arrangement of psychological forces in the “life space” determines behavior, perception and other 
psychological processes.   
Gestalt psychology provides the theoretical foundation for much of social psychology.  
For example, Heider relied heavily upon the principles of structure and organization in his work on 
attribution theory (Heider, 1958).  Lewin’s model of group processes viewed group members’ 
interactions in terms of fields of force (Lewin, 1947a, 1947b).  Perhaps most directly, Asch 
theorized that person perception acts in the same manner; we perceive other individuals as whole 
units (Asch, 1946, 1952). In spite of this centrality, Gestalt principles are largely absent from 
modern Social psychology.   
In the present work, we combine the Gestalt theoretical perspective with modern work in 
attention and perception.  As Asch demonstrated, prior knowledge can bias attention and alter the 
judgment of traits (therefore changing how a person is perceived).  We suggest social-attentional 
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processes can bias attention in a literal regard as well.  Solomon Asch famously claimed, “Most 
social acts have to be understood in their setting, and lose meaning if isolated.  No error in 
thinking about social facts is more serious than the failure to see their place and function” (Asch, 
1952/1987, p. 61).  We extend this argument by suggesting that even perceptual processes need 
to be understood within their broader social context.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
The results of eighteen studies support the hypothesis that the holistic processing of 
faces is attenuated by social facts in a manner that serve the formation of cooperative 
communities. In the first chapter we establish the phenomenon of perceptual dehumanization 
through demonstrating a functional linkage between face processing and social behavior. In the 
second chapter we determine the cognitive-motivational structure that perceptual dehumanization 
targets. In the third and final chapter we establish the cognitive mechanism through which 
perceptual dehumanization occurs.   
Chapter 1 examines the theory of perceptual dehumanization in the context of norm 
violators.  Using multiple manipulations of face processing we establish that people show a 
spontaneous reduction in holistic processing for the faces of norm violators and that engaging in 
holistic processing reduces the ability to punish. These studies establish functional specificity 
through documenting that attenuations in face processing are specific to culpable actors and 
establish real world validity through linking changes in face processing to real world punitive 
rituals.  
In the second chapter we combine past theoretical accounts of dehumanization with 
modern work on perceptual categorization to propose that perceptual dehumanization occurs to 
produce indifference to harm (i.e. suppress helping behavior) as opposed to increasing the desire 
to actively or passively inflict harm.  We do this through documenting that the perceptual 
dehumanization of civil servant in high-risk roles.  Because these civil servants command respect 
and admiration (as confirmed by our own data and work by S. Fiske), the desire to harm them is 
not a potential explanation of perceptual dehumanization.  Rather the effects appear to be driven 
by an increased willingness to sacrifice these individuals for the greater good of society.  
Finally Chapter 3 examines the mechanism that underlines dehumanization.  In this 
chapter, I build upon as Gestalt theoretical perspective, which suggests that top down processes 
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bias the interpretation of subsequent information, and argue that a shift in visual attention leads to 
changes in perceptual processing. Eye tracking results establish that social information leads to 
changes in gaze.  Exogenous manipulations of gaze, which reproduce the gaze patterns 
associated “intentionally harmful actor” and “unintentionally harmful actor” suggest that changes 
in gaze lead to attenuations in face processing.  
This work contributes to a growing body of work in social cognition, which has 
documented the attenuation of the holistic processing of faces under a variety of circumstances 
(Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Ge & Pascalis, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; 
MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 2003).  It is our hope that applying a theoretical perspective can bring a 
measure of conceptual order to the growing empirical literature examining social perception.  
Our work builds upon the argument that faces are intrinsically social.  Face processing 
abilities evolved within an increasingly cooperative social structure. As the primary modality 
through which humans identify others, facial processing may be deeply important to the 
maintenance of these structures.    
The current empirical work builds upon this argument by suggesting that human face 
processing is flexibly engaged in order to facilitate cooperation.  In conjunction, our results 
suggest that social information produces changes in visual attenuation, which attenuate the 
holistic processing of faces in order to strategically inhibit helping behavior.  We posit that 
perceptual dehumanization enables individuals to satisfy the conflicting demands imposed by the 
complexities of social interdependency: the need to get along and cooperate and the need to 
protect oneself and one’s group from potential exploitation.  
An important caveat to our work is the language we use to describe changes in face 
processing.  We make the assumption that face processing is a default process for viewing faces.  
However, this assumption is based upon experiments in which same race faces are presented to 
participants one at a time, in an otherwise, visually devoid environment.  Past research on social 
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information and face processing has indeed proposed the possibility that “face-specific” 
processing in not the default processing of human faces (Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 
2011).  
Understanding the “default” process for viewing faces may inspire broader questions 
about human nature.  From a functionalist perspective, the face processing default is determined 
by the default goals of human behavior.  If humans’ default is to behave in kind, caring and 
empathic ways, and an inhibition of empathy is required to elicit self interested behavior, we 
would predict the default is to process faces holistically.  Alternatively, if the default life of man is 
solitary, nasty and brutish and empathy is required to overcome the natural tendency toward self-
interested behavior, we would predict that the default is to process faces featurally.  One 
interesting way to capture this tension may be through combining computation models of face 
processing and computational models of cooperation.  
By adapting a middle range theoretical lens we are able to make concrete prediction 
(Merton, 1967; Denzin, 1970).   For example, our theory predicts that individuals perceptually 
dehumanize others who it is costly to help, in order to reduce the cognitive cost of not helping.   
Similarly, it predicts the perceptual dehumanization of sexually promiscuous female actors 
because it is advantageous to our own reproductive strategy. 
There are a number of additional avenues future work could explore.  For example, a 
consistent theme throughout our results is that featural processing facilitates treating people as 
means to ends.  This connects to numerous lines of work in social psychology.  For example, 
past work suggests that factors such as power and wealth facilitate treating individuals as a 
means towards an end (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton & Keltner, 2012).  It would be interesting to test, if factors such as these are 
associated with changes in face processing.  
Relatedly, it would be provocative to explore if individual differences, which correspond to 
differences in beliefs about how others should be treated (i.e. do they deserve respect or 
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autonomy or are they simply means to achieving one’s own goals), affect face processing.  This 
argument suggests that a high belief that others can be treated as a means to achieving one’s 
goals, would correspond to globally low levels of holistic processing. Therefore traits such as 
Machiavellianism (Dahling, Whitaker & Levy, 2008) and psychopathy (Hare, 1999) should 
negatively predict the degree to which face stimuli elicit holistic processing.   
Interestingly, perceptual dehumanization may interact with cultural practices in manners, 
which increase individuals’ propensity to perceptually dehumanize certain groups.  Some 
theorists suggest that people are innately predisposed to learn certain types of associations 
(Garcia, Kimeldorf, Koelling, 1955).  Building upon this argument, others have argued that 
cultures acquire norms and practices in line with these innate predilections (Sperber, 2007).  To 
this end, we would predict that cultural practices should produce body and face modification 
rituals, which perceptually dehumanize groups whom they are indifferent to harming.   
Consistently, in Chapter 1 blindfolding increases perceptual dehumanization, facilitates 
punishment, and has emerged in multiple cultural contexts.  Another potential example is war 
paint.  War paint is associated with a perceptually dehumanized group (warriors), distorts holistic 
processing and is a practice that has emerged in several places and times.  Yet another example 
is lipstick.  Past work suggests that sexualized females are dehumanized (McKinon, 1983), 
lipstick is frequently used as a manipulation of feautral processing in work on perception, and 
lipstick is culturally associated with sexualized females.   
These cultural effects may not be limited to faces.  As with faces, human bodies elicit 
specialized processing.  However, these effects are dependent upon the body being presented 
symmetrically (Tarr, 2012).  Therefore one would predict that sexually objectifying postures tend 
to position the body asymmetrically.  Similarly, sexually objectifying clothing may be more likely to 
have asymmetrical patterns, capture attention in manners which alter typical patterns of gaze 
(e.g. bight colors), or even induce asymmetrical postures (e.g. high heels).  
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Finally, one would predict that cartoons may strategically distort faces.  For example, one 
would predict that cartoons, which anthropomorphize animals, would depict the animals in ways 
that increase holistic processing—symmetrical faces, large and bright eyes (in order to draw 
visual attention towards the center of the face), and unobtrusive features.  Conversely, one would 
predict political cartoons, which strip actors of their humanity, depict actors in ways, which 
increase featural processing—small narrow eyes, large visually distracting features and 
asymmetry. 
We believe that the attenuation of face-typical processing – perceptual dehumanization – 
is a basic form of social dehumanization.  Dehumanization is defined “the denial of humanness” 
(e.g. Haslam, 2001).  Perceptual dehumanization is the attenuation of perception processes 
typically evoked by humans.  Therefore, based upon the popular definition, perceptual 
dehumanization is a form of dehumanization.  Furthermore, perceptual dehumanization has been 
documented in most traditionally dehumanized groups. Therefore, although perceptual 
dehumanization is a less socially charged way of denying the features of personhood and occurs 
under a broader range of circumstances, it nonetheless denies one aspect of the typical response 
evoked by persons.  
We realize that this assertion may be problematic as it is made on adductive inference 
and definitional grounds.  Therefore, this claim should be substantiated through an empirical 
process that allows deductively derived conclusions. Because using typically dehumanized 
groups would rely upon adduction to demonstrate dehumanization, it is difficult to test this link.  
One possible way to test this more directly is to explicitly manipulate beliefs about the 
“humanness” of certain entities and demonstrate that beliefs about humanness directly influence 
holistic processing.   
Although the “denial of humanness” is typically considered a negative process (in both 
the attributions association with the target of dehumanization and the implications about an 
observer who would view another person as less than human), we suggest that perceptual 
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dehumanization is a value-neutral process.  Unlike linguistic markers of dehumanization, 
perceptual dehumanization does not imply negative attitudes.  Rather, it suggests an indifference 
to the individual target’s welfare.  
As a consequence, observers' moral reactions to the perceptual dehumanization will 
hinge on their beliefs about the legitimacy of the resultant behavior.  For instance, when utilitarian 
and deontological moral rules clash, as in in the trolley problem, utilitarians would likely view the 
perceptual dehumanization of the single individual as laudable and perceptual dehumanization of 
the group as questionable.  On the other hand, deontological thinkers would likely support the 
opposite pattern of perceptual dehumanization.  Similarly, most individuals would deem the 
perceptual dehumanization of a “rapist” as beneficial and the perceptual dehumanization of a 
“rape victim” as abhorrent, but of course there is enormous variance in the ways in which 
individuals define rape.  
Another question raised by our results is the degree to which the attenuation of face 
processing is conscious.  Although the direction of attention is arguably a fully conscious, 
intentional process (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007), the consequences of a change in attention appear 
to function outside of individual’s awareness. Insofar as attention is controllable, unfair treatment 
due to perceptual dehumanization may be easy to attenuate. To the degree that one believes 
perceptual dehumanization leads to unfair treatment, linking attention to perceptual 
dehumanization is potentially extremely useful because this link offers low effort automatic 
cognitive solutions to improving the treatment of dehumanized groups.  
Notably, atypical engagement with faces is often considered rude and increases the risk 
of retaliatory actions such as lawsuits.  So much so, that advising typical engagement (eye 
contact) appears to be endorsed in several situations where perceptual dehumanization may 
occur.  For example, current medical teaching encourages future surgeons to maintain eye 
contact with their patients.  Similarly, the HR practices of many companies suggest that eye 
contact is the key to good customer service (Batt, 2002).   
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That said, “humanizing” may not be optimal under many circumstances.  Insofar as 
redirecting attention reduces dissonance and discomfort, removing this avenue of emotional self-
protection may have negative consequences. For example, surgeons who maintain eye contact 
with patients have significantly higher rates of PTSD than surgeons who do not maintain eye 
contact with patients  (Warren, Jones, Shafi, Roden-Foreman, Bennett & Foreman, 2013).  
Moreover, although attention is a mechanism which functions at a conscious level of 
analysis, there may be other mechanisms that function outside of consciousness, which produce 
the changes in attentional processing.  For example, changes in hormones such as oxytocin and 
testosterone may drive the attentional changes.  Work on autistic patients, who show abnormal 
patterns of attention when attending to faces, documents that autism is associated with atypical 
levels of these hormones (Falter, Plaisted & Davis, 2008). Further work demonstrates that 
increasing levels of oxytocin increases gaze to the eye region of human faces (Guastella, Mitchell 
& Dadds, 2008).  If hormones are driving changes in attentional deployment it further complicates 
whether perceptual dehumanization is an intentional or unintentional action.    
In closing it is worth noting the broader theoretical implications of this work.  This work 
suggests that social functionalism may provide researchers in social cognition a potentially fruitful 
avenue of theorizing.  There are deep complementary aspects of social functionalism and 
cognitive structuralism. Social functionalism builds on the premise that human beings are indeed 
deeply social creatures and focuses on why questions: the adaptive challenges of coping with an 
extraordinary range of cultural-historical environments.  What do people need to do to survive and 
thrive in collectivities regulated by complex accountability relationships, norms and values?  In 
contrast, cognitive structuralism builds upon the assumption that the complex circuitry of the brain 
can be understood as a computational system.  It focuses on mechanism: “how” questions. 
Whereas social functionalism highlights the larger context within which perception and cognition 
occur, it fails—left to its own devices--to identify the exact, nature of these perceptual and 
cognitive processes and how they connect to the solution of recurring adaptive problems. 
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APPENDIX  
Study 1.1 
 
Instructions: 
In the following study you will be asked to complete an association test.    
You will see photographs of people each paired with a descriptions of an action that individual 
performed.  Your task is to remember the action each individual performed.  
During the first phase you will see a photograph of one person at a time.  Underneath each 
picture, you will see a description of an action or behavior in which that person  has engaged.  
You will see three blocks of 12 person-behavior pairings. You will see each person-behavior 
pairing displayed on screen for 8.5 seconds.  The slide will automatically advance to next 
pair.  Do not click on anything. 
 After all 12 person-action pairings have been displayed, you will be tested on you ability to recall 
the pairings.   
During the recall phase you will see all 12 people on screen at once.  
 Each behavior will be displayed underneath the array of people one at a time.  
Your task is to determine which person performed each action by indicating the number that 
corresponds to the correct person.    
The task is very hard.  You may not always know the answer.  If you do not know the answer, 
guess.  You must answer every question.   
 
Actions: 
Robbery of $100,000 of Art 
Killed two individuals  
Committed first degree murder 
Committed Assault 
Committed first degree rape 
Kidnapped and held someone hostage for a year 
Committed Domestic Violence (broke wife’s arm and jaw) 
Theft of $50,000 in goods 
Embezzlement of $100,000  
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Property Destruction ($50,000 in damages) 
Fraud ($75,000 in damages) 
Burglary of $10,000 in goods and services 
Armed Robbery of $25,000  of goods. 
Extortion of $15,000 
Blackmail Congressman for $100,000 
Commercial Bribery and Kickbacks for over $50,000 
Counterfeiting of $35,000 in products 
Trafficking of $100,000 of drugs 
Sexual Exploitation of Minors for $50,000 profit 
Committed treason for 2 years 
Espionage 
Providing Material Support to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Smuggled a Chemical Weapons of Weapons of Mass Destruction into country 
Committed arson and destroyed a house 
Donated $300,000 to a Museum 
Saved two individuals from drowning 
Saved an individuals life 
Cared for sick friend  
Donated $100,000 to a fund against RAPE 
Cared for sick friend  
Donated $180,000 to a domestic violence fund 
Donated $150,000 to education initiative 
Donated $300,000 to hospital 
Donated $150,000 to habitat for humanity 
Donated $250,000 to music education 
Donated $50,000 to medical research 
Donated $75,000 to police fund  
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Donated $45,000 to fight Malaria 
Donated $500,000 to fight political corruption 
Donated $150,000 to homeless shelter 
Donated $100,000 to arts education 
Donated $300,000 to drug rehabilitation programs 
Donated $150,000 to victims of sexual assault fund 
Worked in public service for his country for 10 years 
Worked in public service for his country for 35 years 
Worked in anti-terrorist organization for 20 years 
Worked in counter-terrorist task force for 50 years 
Built 3 houses for habitat for humanity 
walked his dog 
fed his cat 
cooked dinner 
took a shower 
washed clothing 
vacuumed floor 
cleaned house 
read a book 
passed the bar 
ate an snack 
ate a steak 
watched movie 
took clothing to a local drycleaner 
watched a Clockwork Orange yesterday 
Read an autobiography of George Washington 
walked his King Charles Caviler Spaniel 
Attended Yale university School of law 
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Ate a sliced gala apple 
took suit to be altered 
watched the movie It's a Wonderful Life 
Took a vacation to Paris 
Took a vacation to Hawaii 
Allows dog to sleep on Sofa 
Ate a turkey and Swiss sandwich for lunch yesterday 
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Study 1.2 
 
Instructions: 
In the following study you will be asked to complete an association test.    
You will see photographs of people each paired with a descriptions of an action that individual 
performed.  Your task is to remember the action each individual performed.  
During the first phase you will see a photograph of one person at a time.  Underneath each 
picture, you will see a description of an action or behavior in which that person  has engaged.  
You will see two blocks of 10 person-behavior pairings. You will see each person-behavior pairing 
displayed on screen for 12 seconds.  The slide will automatically advance to next pair.  Do not 
click on anything. 
 After all 10 person-action pairings have been displayed, you will be tested on you ability to recall 
the pairings.   
During the recall phase you will see all 10 people on screen at once.  
 Each behavior will be displayed underneath the array of people one at a time.  
Your task is to determine which person performed each action by indicating the number that 
corresponds to the correct person.    
The task is very hard.  You may not always know the answer.  If you do not know the answer, 
guess.  You must answer every question.   
 
Actions: 
Robbery of $100,000 of Art 
Killed two individuals  
Committed first degree murder 
Assault 
Commmitted first degree rape 
Kidnapped and held someone hostage for a year 
Comitted Domestic Violence (broke wifes arm and jaw) 
Theft of $50,000 in goods 
Embezzlementof $100,000  
Armed Robbery of $25,000  of goods. 
Blackmail Congressman for $100,000 
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Commercial Bribery and Kickbacks for over $50,000 
Counterfeiting of $35,000 in products 
Trafficking of $100,000 of drugs 
Sexual Exploitation of Minors for $50,000 profit 
Committed treason for 2 years 
Espionage 
Providing Material Support to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Smuggled a Chemical Weapons of Weapons of Mass Destruction into country 
Committed arson and destroyed a house 
Donated $300,000 to a Museum 
Saved two individuals from drowning 
Saved an individuals life 
Cared for sick friend  
Donated $100,000 to a fund against RAPE 
Cared for sick friend  
Donated $180,000 to a domestic violence fund 
Donated $150,000 to education inititive 
Donated $250,000 to music education 
Donated $50,000 to medical research 
Donated $500,000 to fight political corruption 
Donated $150,000 to Hospital 
Donated $100,000 to arts education 
Donated $300,000 to drug rehabilitation programs 
Donated $150,000 to victims of sexual assault fund 
Worked in public service for his country for 10 years 
Worked in public service for his country for 35 years 
Worked in anti-terrorist organization for 20 years 
Worked in counter-terrorist task force for 50 years 
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Built 3 houses for habitat for humanity 
 
Study 1.3 
 
Instructions: 
 In this study your task is to determine if the top half of two different faces match.  
  
 
The study requires that you pay careful attention.  The experiment will advance automatically at a 
rapid pace.  You will be asked to make responses using your keyboard.  
 Prior to completing the matching task, you will learn some background information about the 
people whose faces you are about to see.  
  
  
Specifically you will read about crime which occurred.  One of the individuals is the victim one of 
the individuals is the perpetrator.   
After you read about the crime you will perform a perceptual recognition task involving each of the 
actors.   
 
You will perform this recognition task for each of the two actors separately.  
In the recognition task you will first see a photograph of one of the actors described in the 
background information.  
 
 You will then see a second photograph.  Your task is to determine if the two top-halves of the 
sequentially presented pairs of faces are the same or different.  
After you have seen both faces you will be asked indicate if the top half of the two face is the 
same.   
 
On this screen respond using your keyboard.   
If the top half of the two photos is the same, respond by pressing F on your keyboard.   
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If the top half of the two photos is different, respond by pressing J on your keyboard.   
Do not respond before the response screen!  
 
Comprehension questions: 
Participants were required to answer all three questions correctly in order to move on to the task.   
Your task is to determine if:  
• If the two sequentially presented photos are the same  
• If the bottom half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
• If the top half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
F indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
J indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
 
Actions: 
Aaron stole $100,000 from William 
Casey killed Luis 
Robert killed Jose 
Adam assaulted Dustin 
John raped Jeffrey 
Jose kidnapped and held Nathaniel hostage  
Raymond stole of $50,000 in goods from Aaron 
Keith embezzled $50,000 from Nathan 
Alex blackmail $100,000 from Gary 
Edward stole $100,000 from Wesley 
Joseph killed Daniel 
Joel killed Christopher 
Brandon assaulted Jesse 
Brent raped Vincent 
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Sean kidnapped and held hostage Derek 
Joseph stole of $50,000 in goods from Kyle 
Joel embezzled $90,000 from Vincent 
Brandon blackmail $9,000 from Derek 
Derek stole $197,000 from Douglas 
Kyle killed Shawn 
Phillip killed Derrick 
Thomas assaulted Jonathan 
Philip raped Michael 
Nicholas kidnapped and held hostage Jeremy 
Travis stole of $53,000 in goods from Marcus 
Alexander embezzled $59,000 from Evan 
Eric blackmail $100,000 from Shane 
Andrew stole $134,000 from Donald 
Bryan killed Steven 
Carlos killed Benjamin 
Charles assaulted George 
Juan raped Peter 
Gregory kidnapped and held Jordan hostage   
Jason stole of $50,000 in goods from Cody 
Antonio embezzled $70,000 from James 
Adrian blackmail $250,000 from Aaron 
Kevin stole $760,000 from Tyler 
Trevor killed Kenneth 
Brett killed Chad 
Raymond assaulted Nathan 
Keith raped Gary 
Alex kidnapped and held Wesley hostage   
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Edward stole of $80,000 in goods from Daniel 
Joseph embezzled $53,000 from Christopher 
Joel blackmail $800,000 from Jesse 
Brandon stole $172,000 from Vincent 
Brent killed Derek 
Sean killed Kyle 
Frank assaulted Phillip 
Zachary raped Thomas 
Nathaniel kidnapped and held Philip hostage   
David stole of $70,000 in goods from Sean 
Anthony embezzled $5,000 from Frank 
Christian blackmail $10,000 from Zachary 
Curtis stole $1,000 from Ronald 
Mark killed Paul 
Erik killed Corey 
Victor assaulted Matthew 
Seth raped Gabriel 
Richard kidnapped and held Brian hostage   
Austin stole of $500,000 in goods from Scott 
Bradley embezzled $5,000 from Craig 
Cory blackmail $10,000 from Jacob 
 
  
	  99	  
	  
Study 1.4 
Instructions: 
 In this study your task is to determine if the top half of two different faces match.  
  
 
The study requires that you pay careful attention.  The experiment will advance automatically at a 
rapid pace.  You will be asked to make responses using your keyboard.  
 Prior to completing the matching task, you will learn some background information about the 
people whose faces you are about to see.  
  
  
Specifically you will read about harm, which occurred, which occurred.     
After you read about the harm you will perform a perceptual recognition task involving the 
perpetrator of the harm.   
 
In the recognition task you will first see a photograph of the perpetrator of the harm.   
 
Your task is to determine if the two top-halves of the sequentially presented pairs of faces are 
the same or different.  
After you have seen both faces you will be asked indicate if the top half of the two faces are the 
same.   
 
On this screen respond using your keyboard.   
If the top half of the two photos is the same, respond by pressing F on your keyboard.   
  
  
If the top half of the two photos is different, respond by pressing J on your keyboard.   
Do not respond before the response screen!  
 
Comprehension questions: 
Participants were required to answer all three questions correctly in order to move on to 
the task.   
	  100	  
	  
Your task is to determine if:  
• If the two sequentially presented photos are the same  
• If the bottom half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
• If the top half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
F indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
J indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
 
Actions: 
intentionally shot his brother  
intentionally shot his father  
Intentionally started a fire that killed someone 
Accidentally shot his wife 
Intentionally killed his sister in a car accident 
Intentionally started a fire that killed his wife 
Accidentally shot and killed a woman in war 
Intentionally killed someone by feeding her something to which they were highly 
allergic. 
Accidentally poisoned his father 
Accidentally shot his brother  
Accidentally pushed someone off a train, he died 
Accidentally killed his brother in a car accident 
Intentionally started a fire that killed three people 
Intentionally electrocuted someone. 
Accidentally pushed someone off a boat, he died. 
Accidentally mislabeled pills to cause someone to overdose on pain medication and 
die 
intentionally shot his sister  
Intentionally killed someone by running them over with car 
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Accidentally killed his sister in a car accident 
Accidentally killed someone by running them over with a motor boat 
Accidentally shot his cousin  
Intentionally strangled his sister 
Accidentally decapitated someone with a boat 
Intentionally pushed someone off a train, he died 
Accidentally shot his mother 
Intentionally shot and killed a woman in war 
Intentionally shot and killed a child in war 
Intentionally strangled his wife 
Accidentally killed someone by drowning them 
Accidentally shot someone 
Intentionally killed someone by drowning them 
Intentionally killed his brother in a car accident 
intentionally shot his mother 
Intentionally poisoned someone 
Intentionally hit and killed someone with car 
Intentionally pushed someone off a boat, he died. 
Accidentally started a fire that killed his family 
Accidentally hit and killed someone with car 
Intentionally killed someone a boat 
Accidentally strangled his wife 
intentionally shot his cousin  
Intentionally strangled someone 
Accidentally shot his sister  
Accidentally started a fire that killed his wife 
Intentionally decapitated someone with a boat 
Accidentally poisoned his brother 
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Accidentally shot and killed a child in war 
Accidentally strangled his sister 
Accidentally electrocuted someone. 
intentionally shot someone 
Accidentally poisoned someone 
intentionally shot his wife 
Accidentally started a fire that killed someone 
Accidentally killed someone a boat 
Accidentally shot his father  
Intentionally killed someone by running them over with a motor boat 
Intentionally poisoned his brother 
Intentionally poisoned his father 
Intentionally started a fire that killed his family 
Intentionally mislabeled pills to cause someone to overdose on pain medication and 
die 
Accidentally killed someone by running them over with car 
Accidentally started a fire that killed three people 
Accidentally killed someone by feeding her something to which they were highly 
allergic. 
Accidentally strangled someone 
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Study 1.5 
 
Manipulation:  
Unlike pedophilia where the scientific evidence fails to indicate biological roots, impulsive violent 
and aggressive behavior has been shown to have a biological basis.  The actions committed by 
violent men are largely biologically predetermined and nearly impossible for them to prevent in 
spite of their best intentions. Like a homosexuality, scientific research indicates this is 
unchangeable. 
 
Scientific data indicates that the men who commit impulsive, violent crimes do so because of 
a  genetic defect was located to the X chromosome in the region of p11-12; a point mutation was 
identified in the eighth exon of the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) structural gene.  Early 
childhood maltreatment and abuse activate the gene which leads to changes glutamine to a 
termination codon, a low concentrations of 5-hydroxyindole-3-acetic acid (5-HIAA) and other 
MAOA-breakdown products.  This leads to a smaller subgenual cortex and a 5 to 10 percent 
reduction in brain density in portions of the paralimbic system, the orbitofrontal cortex and the 
caudate, reduced white matter in the medial prefontal and increased grey matter in the orbital 
gyrus causing impulsive bouts of aggression. 
  
  
 
Unlike violent and aggressive behavior, where the scientific evidence fails to indicate biological 
roots, pedophilia has been shown to have a biological basis.  The actions committed by 
pedophiles are largely biologically predetermined and nearly impossible for them to prevent in 
spite of their best intentions. Like a homosexuality, scientific research indicates this is 
unchangeable.  
 
Scientific data indicates that the men who commit pedophilia do so because of a  genetic defect 
was located to the X chromosome in the region of p11-12; a point mutation was identified in the 
eighth exon of the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) structural gene.  Early childhood maltreatment 
and sexual abuse activate the gene which leads to changes glutamine to a termination codThis 
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leads to a smaller subgenual cortex and a 5 to 10 percent reduction in brain density in portions of 
the paralimbic system, the orbitofrontal cortex and the caudate, reduced white matter in the 
medial prefontal and increased grey matter in the orbital gyrus causing pedophilia. 
  
 
 
Study 6 
“What would be an appropriate jail or prison sentence for X?” A unique 13-point scale adopted 
from the justice-research literature (Darley et al, 2001; Carlsmith et al, 2002). It ranged from “No 
sentence” to “Death sentence” with non-linear intervals given in weeks, months, and years. 
This scale is based on psychometric research suggesting that people perceive the difference 
between a 6-month sentence and a 1-year sentence as roughly equivalent to the difference 
between 1 years and 5 years. 
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Study 2.1 
Instructions: 
In the following study you will be asked to complete an association test.    
You will see photographs of people displayed above their name.  Your task is to remember each 
person’s name.  
During the first phase you will see a photograph of one person at a time.  Underneath each 
picture, you will see the person’s name 
You will see three blocks of 10 person-name pairings. You will see each person-name pairing 
displayed on screen for 12.5 seconds.  The slide will automatically advance to next pair.  Do not 
click on anything. 
 After all 10 person-name pairings have been displayed, you will be tested on you ability to recall 
the pairings.   
During the recall phase you will see all 10 people on screen at once.  
 Each name will be displayed underneath the array of people one at a time.  
Your task is to determine which person corresponds to each name indicating the number that 
corresponds to the correct person.    
The task is very hard.  You may not always know the answer.  If you do not know the answer, 
guess.  You must answer every question.   
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Study 2.2 
Instructions: 
In the following study you will be asked to complete an association test.    
You will see photographs of people displayed above their name.  Your task is to remember each 
person’s name.  
During the first phase you will see a photograph of one person at a time.  Underneath each 
picture, you will see the person’s name 
You will see three blocks of 6 person-name pairings. You will see each person-name pairing 
displayed on screen for 9 seconds.  The slide will automatically advance to next pair.  Do not click 
on anything. 
 After all 6 person-name pairings have been displayed, you will be tested on you ability to recall 
the pairings.   
During the recall phase you will see all 6 people on screen at once.  
 Each name will be displayed underneath the array of people one at a time.  
Your task is to determine which person corresponds to each name indicating the number that 
corresponds to the correct person.    
The task is very hard.  You may not always know the answer.  If you do not know the answer, 
guess.  You must answer every question.   
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Instructions: 
 In this study your task is to determine if the top half of two different faces match.  
The study requires that you pay careful attention.  The experiment will advance automatically at a 
rapid pace.  You will be asked to make responses using your keyboard.  
 All of the individuals you will see are a part of U.S. army.  Prior to completing the matching task, 
you will learn will learn what their role is in the United States Armed forces.     
After you read about their role you will perform a perceptual recognition task for the individual you 
just learned about. 
In the recognition task you will first see a photograph of them.   
Your task is to determine if the two top-halves a second photograph is the same or different than 
the first actors face 
After you have seen both faces you will be asked indicate if the top half of the two faces are the 
same.   
On this screen respond using your keyboard.   
If the top half of the two photos is the same, respond by pressing F on your keyboard.   
If the top half of the two photos is different, respond by pressing J on your keyboard.   
Do not respond before the response screen!  
Comprehension questions: 
Participants were required to answer all three questions correctly in order to move on to 
the task.   
Your task is to determine if:  
• If the two sequentially presented photos are the same  
• If the bottom half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
• If the top half of the two sequentially presented photos are the same 
F indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
J indicates the two photos are: 
• the same 
• different 
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Study 2.5 
 
One [20] Americans were kidnapped in southern Algeria by a terrorist group affiliated with Al 
Qaeda.  The kidnapping was done for ransom in order to finance the organizations terrorist 
activity (such as the world trade center attacks).  The group demands a ransom from the country 
of citizenship of the hostages or they will publically torture and execute the hostages. 
In previous cases where ransoms have been paid for two people have ranged between 
$1,000,000-$4,000,000 (USD). What is the maximum ransom you would be willing to pay in US 
dollars?  
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Actions used in Chapter 3 
 
Actions: 
intentionally shot his brother  
intentionally shot his father  
Intentionally started a fire that killed someone 
Accidentally shot his wife 
Intentionally killed his sister in a car accident 
Intentionally started a fire that killed his wife 
Accidentally shot and killed a woman in war 
Intentionally killed someone by feeding her something to which they were highly 
allergic. 
Accidentally poisoned his father 
Accidentally shot his brother  
Accidentally pushed someone off a train, he died 
Accidentally killed his brother in a car accident 
Intentionally started a fire that killed three people 
Intentionally electrocuted someone. 
Accidentally pushed someone off a boat, he died. 
Accidentally mislabeled pills to cause someone to overdose on pain medication and 
die 
intentionally shot his sister  
Intentionally killed someone by running them over with car 
Accidentally killed his sister in a car accident 
Accidentally killed someone by running them over with a motor boat 
Accidentally shot his cousin  
Intentionally strangled his sister 
Accidentally decapitated someone with a boat 
Intentionally pushed someone off a train, he died 
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Accidentally shot his mother 
Intentionally shot and killed a woman in war 
Intentionally shot and killed a child in war 
Intentionally strangled his wife 
Accidentally killed someone by drowning them 
Accidentally shot someone 
Intentionally killed someone by drowning them 
Intentionally killed his brother in a car accident 
intentionally shot his mother 
Intentionally poisoned someone 
Intentionally hit and killed someone with car 
Intentionally pushed someone off a boat, he died. 
Accidentally started a fire that killed his family 
Accidentally hit and killed someone with car 
Intentionally killed someone a boat 
Accidentally strangled his wife 
intentionally shot his cousin  
Intentionally strangled someone 
Accidentally shot his sister  
Accidentally started a fire that killed his wife 
Intentionally decapitated someone with a boat 
Accidentally poisoned his brother 
Accidentally shot and killed a child in war 
Accidentally strangled his sister 
Accidentally electrocuted someone. 
intentionally shot someone 
Accidentally poisoned someone 
intentionally shot his wife 
	  111	  
	  
Accidentally started a fire that killed someone 
Accidentally killed someone a boat 
Accidentally shot his father  
Intentionally killed someone by running them over with a motor boat 
Intentionally poisoned his brother 
Intentionally poisoned his father 
Intentionally started a fire that killed his family 
Intentionally mislabeled pills to cause someone to overdose on pain medication and 
die 
Accidentally killed someone by running them over with car 
Accidentally started a fire that killed three people 
Accidentally killed someone by feeding her something to which they were highly 
allergic. 
Accidentally strangled someone 
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Tables 
Table 1.1 
Convergent Operationalizations of Perceptual Dehumanization  
 
Note.  Table 1.1 documents the strengths and weaknesses of each of the methods used 
to impair holistic processing.  
  
!
Task!
(Mechanism+
Impaired)+
Description! Negative!Task!Features! Confounds!Controlled!for!Facial!Inversion!Effect!
(Face2typical+
processing)+
In!a!recognition!memory,!task!facial!inversion!is!used!to!impair!face=typical!processing!
The!mechanism!underlying!the!impairment!is!unclear!and!the!task!uses!recall.!!!
Task!structure!controls!for!response!bias!
Low!Frequency!Resolution!
(Featural+
processing)+
In!a!recognition!memory!task!removal!of!high!spatial!frequency!information!impairs!featural!processing!!
A!recognition!recall!paradigm.!!! Effects!are!in!the!opposite!direction,!controlling!for!any!attentional!effects!(controlling!for!attentional!effects).!!!Facial!Composite!Task!
(Holistic+
processing)+
In!a!task!facial!offsetting!is!used!to!impair!holistic!processing! The!”partial”!design!may!be!associated!with!a!response!bias!
Clearest!manipulation!of!holistic!processing!Uses!a!perceptual!matching!task!
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Table 1.2 
Convergent Evidence for Perceptual Dehumanization  
 
Note.  Table 1.2 documents the co-occurrence between the attenuation of face typical processing 
and the mistreatment of social groups.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Category Perceptual effects 
Dehumanization 
Discrimination 
Race Michel, Rossion, Han, 
Chung, and Caldara, 
2006; Rhodes, 
Hayward & Winkler, 
2006; Tanaka, Kiefer 
& Bukach, 2004 
Jahoda, 1999; 
Cuddy., Rock, & 
Norton, 2007 
Ayres, 1991; Milkman, 
L., Akinola, & Chugh, 
2012; Norton, Vandello, 
& Darley, 2004 
Group  Bernstein, Young, & 
Hugenberg, 2007; 
Hugenberg, & 
Corneille, 2009;  
 
Bar-Tal, 2000; 
Castano, & Giner-
Sorolla, 2006; Vaes, 
Paladino, Castelli, 
Leyens, & 
Giovanazzi, 2003 
Tajfel, 1970 
Gender Bernard, Gervais, 
Allen, Campomizzi, &  
Klein 2012 
Nussbaum, 1999; 
Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997;  
 
MacKinnon, 1987; 
Norton, Vandello, & 
Darley, 2004 
Dominate Group 
Shriver, Young, 
Hugenberg, Bernstein, 
and Lanter, 2008 
Hodson,& Costello, 
2007 
Sidanius, & Pratto, 2001 
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Table 2.1  
Elicitation conditions of three forms of dehumanization  
 
 
Note.  Table 2.1 documents commonalities and differences in the conditions under which classic 
dehumanization, infrahumanization and perceptual dehumanization occur. 
 
 
 
 
!
Group! Dehumanization! Infra"
humanization!
Perceptual*
Dehumanization!Enemy!Out*groups! ✔! ✔! ✔!!Norm%Violators ✔! ✔! ✔!Subordinate,!Out$Groups ✔! ✔! ✔!
Out$Groups!
!! !!
✔! ✔!
!Minimal'Groups
!!!!
!
✔!
!Civil%Servants
!! !!
!
✔!
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Table 3.1 
Levels of Analysis of Perceptual Dehumanization  
Abstract Level Temporal 
Scale 
Example Operationalization 
Behavioral < 3 sec Physical harm Behavior 
Social/Cognitive 2-3 Sec Explicit attitude Self report 
Embodiment 300ms Failure to attend 
to eyes 
Eye movements 
Perceptual 150ms Inhibition of face 
processing 
Face specific 
processing 
Neural 10ms Lateral inhibition Neural Circuit 
Neural 1ms Basic signal Neural Spike 
 
Note.  Table 3.1 describes the psychological context in which the effects of perceptual 
dehumanization must be understood. It highlights the different levels of analysis which 
dehumanization effects and which effect perceptual dehumanization.  It captures the hierarchical 
organization of the mind using stimulus time scale. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A description of the procedure of used in Study 1. In the learning phase individuals 
saw 12 face-action pairings.  In the testing phase, individuals saw the 12 actions appear below 
the faces.  Participants saw three blocks of upright faces and three blocks of inverted faces.   
 
       
 
X 3 
blocks 
X 3 
blocks 
TASK FEATURES 
 
Timing 
•  Target: 12 sec 
•  ISI: 0 sec 
Actions 
•  Positive, Neutral & 
Negative 
Face Dataset 
Todorov’s governors 
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Figure 1.2. The results of studies 1 and 2 suggest faces of norm violators are processed 
atypically. Study 1 suggests that pairing faces with negative social information attenuates the 
effects of inversion.  Study 2 demonstrates that pairing faces with negative acts magnifies the 
effect of high frequency spatial filters.    
       
 
  
  
Study&2&
Study&1&
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Figure 1.3. The procedure used in Study 3. The order of the victim and perpetrator of the action 
were randomized across participants.  Participants indicated whether the top half of the faces 
matched by pressing a key.   
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Figure 1.4. The results of studies 6A and 6B directly link perceptual dehumanization to an 
increased willingness to punish. Study 6A demonstrates inversion increases punitiveness. Study 
6B  demonstrates that low frequency spatial reduce punitiveness.  
 
 
 
  
Study&6A&
Study&6B&
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Figure 1.5. Study 7B demonstrates the effect of perceptual dehumanization in a real world 
context.  Removing the eye information (blindfolding) norm violators reduces willingness to 
donate to stop severe punishments.   
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Figure 2.1 Study 1 suggests that dressing individuals as either convicts or policemen attenuate 
the effects of inversion relative to dressing them in ordinary attire (a blue or orange t-shirt). 
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Figure 2.2. The procedure used in Study 4. Participants indicated whether the top half of the 
faces matched by pressing a key.  High and low risk jobs, and intact and offset faces were 
interleaved.   
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Figure 2.3. The results of study 4 suggest the faces of soldiers are only processed atypically if 
they are in high-risk jobs.   In a perceptual matching task, the effect of offsetting was significantly 
greater for soldiers in low-risk jobs than soldiers in high-risk jobs.    
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Figure 2.4. The results of studies 5 directly link perceptual dehumanization to an increased 
willingness to sacrifice soldiers for the greater good. Study 5 demonstrates that inversion 
decreases willingness to pay a ransom for a solider when their face is displayed as inverted 
rather than upright.  
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Figure 3.1. A description of the procedure of used in Study 1. In the learning phase individuals 
saw 6 face-action pairings.  In the testing phase, individuals saw the 6 actions appear below the 
faces.  Eye movements were recorded using a Tobii system.   
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Figure 3.2. Panel A illustrates a schematic of the regions of interest used in analysis.  Panel B 
illustrates the percentage of fixations occurring in each region of interest for each condition.  The 
colors associated with an ROI on the schematic in Panel A represent the percentage of fixations 
in the ROI in Panel B. 
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Figure 3.3. Panel A illustrates a sample fixation pattern from Study 2.  The fixations points of 
fixation were computed from Study 1, based upon the “average” fixation points when the actor 
committed an unintentional harm.  Panel B illustrates the fixation pattern from Study 3 for the 
same face.  The fixations points were computed from Study 1, based upon the “average” fixation 
points when the actor committed an intentional harm.   
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Figure 3.4. The results of studies 2 and 3 directly link visual fixation to attenuations in holistic 
processing. Study 2 demonstrates that adapting the fixation pattern associated with “norm 
followers” removes perceptual dehumanization—i.e. produces normal inversions effects—
regardless of the moral status of the actor. Study 3 demonstrates that adapting the fixation 
pattern associated with “norm violators” leads to an attenuation in the holistic processing of 
faces—i.e. an attenuation of the facial inversions effects— regardless of the moral status of the 
actor.   
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Figure3.5. Study 5 directly link visual fixations to an increased willingness to punish.  Results 
suggest that punitiveness is significantly increased when participants fixate featurally and 
significantly decreased when participants fixate centrally.  The effect of visual fixation on 
punishment depends upon the race of target.  
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